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Costs of college education have escalated rapidly over the past decade-
and-a-half, outstripping the general rate of inflation. For the period 1977
to 1987, charges for tuition, fees, and room and board at private colleges
and universities increased by 132.2 percent, while charges at public colleges
and universities increased by 109.2 percent.' For the same period the
consumer price index for all items increased by 99.6 percent.
2
If one looks only at the 1980s, the disparity between increases in costs
for higher education and the general inflation rate has been even greater.
In fact, the cost of tuition went up faster during the 1980s than any other
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1. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX INCENTIVES FOR EDUCATION 100T CONG., 2D SESS.
34 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter TAX INCENTIVES FOR EDUCATION]. For extensive discussions
of college cost increases see College Costs and Tuition: What Are the Issues?, Proceedings
from a National Conference sponsored by the National Center for Postsecondary Governance
and Finance (J.B. Lee, ed. Jan. 1988); Hauptman & Hartle, Tuition Increases Since 1970: A
Perspective, Special Insert to Higher Education and National Affairs, Newsletter of American
Council on Education (Feb. 1987). The opposite situation prevailed during the 1970s. While
higher education cost increases outpaced general inflation during the 1980s, they actually
lagged behind general inflation during the 1970s. Hauptman & Hartle, supra, at 6.
2. TAX INCENTIVES FOR EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 34. The following table details
college cost increases and changes in the consumer price index for the years 1977-87.
Public Private
Year Tuition Total Tuition Total Change
Costs Costs in CPI
1977 7.4 4.1 4.0 4.0 6.5
1978 0.0 4.2 6.3 5.3 7.7
1979 4.8 5.1 6.9 6.2 11.3
1980 4.5 6.7 10.4 8.1 13.5
1981 3.8 4.6 12.2 10.1 10.4
1982 16.0 13.6 13.1 13.2 6.1
1983 19.5 13.3 8.4 8.6 3.2
1984 12.9 7.6 15.1 12.9 4.3
1985 1.9 3.4 8.4 6.9 3.6
1986 10.3 8.9 8.0 7.1 1.9
1987 7.6 5.5 6.9 5.6 3.7
1977-87 131.2 109.2 158.6 132.2 99.6
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good or service, including medical care.' For example, the average annual
rate of general inflation during the period 1982 to 1986 was approximately
four percent, while the rate was almost ten percent for private colleges and
was over seven percent for public colleges. 4 The College Board estimates
the increase in college costs for the 1989-90 school year to be about nine
percent for private four year colleges, and eight percent for public four
year colleges. This compares to a rise in the consumer price index of 5.2
percent for the 12 months ending in June, 1988. 5 The Department of
Education projects that when a child born in 1989 enters college in 2007,
total costs for four years will be $200,000 at a private institution and
$60,000 at a public institution.6 This compares to a current four year total
cost of about $50,000 at a private institution and $18,000 at a public
institution.
7
Another way to view the situation is to compare the rise in college costs
to the rise in disposable income. Between 1980 and 1987, disposable income
grew at an average annual rate of 6.5 percent. For the same period tuition
and fees increased at a rate of 9.8 percent.8 This contrasts with the trend
prior to the 1980s, when disposable income increased more rapidly than the
cost of attending college. 9
These large increases in costs of higher education have not brought with
them comparable initiatives at the federal level for keeping the costs of
college education affordable. The federal government currently provides a
number of grant and loan programs to help finance higher education.
Among these are Pell Grants, Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants,
College Work Study, Perkins Loans, Guaranteed Student Loans, PLUS
Loans for parent borrowers, and Supplemental Student Loans for student
borrowers.10 Each of these has some disadvantages. Pell Grants and Sup-
3. Statement of Arthur Hauptman, Educational Consultant, American Council on
Education, in INvrrATIoNAL CONFERENCE ON COLLEGE PREPAYMENT AND SAVINGS PLANS 21
(1987) [hereinafter INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE].
4. See Tax Incentives for Education: Hearing Before the Senate Finance Comm., 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1988) (Statement of John D. Finnerty, Executive Vice-President and
Chief Financial Officer, College Savings Bank) [hereinafter Tax Incentives for Education
Hearing].
5. Cost of College Still Outpacing Inflation Rate, Washington Post, Aug. 8, 1989, at
Al, col. 6, citing THE COLLEGE BOARD ANmAL SURVEY OF COLLEGES (1989); Blumenstyk &
Myers, For Most, Cost of Going to College Outpaces Inflation Again, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUC., Aug. 16, 1989, at Al, A26 to A31.
6. Tax Incentives for Education Hearing, supra note 4, at 163 (Statement of 0.
Donaldson Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
7. Id.
8. MINr. HIGHER EDUCATION COORDINATING BD., STATE SAVING INCENTIVE AND PREPAID
TUITION PLANS 4 (1988) [hereinafter STATE SAVING AND PREPAID TUITION PLANS].
9. Id.
10. For a general explanation of the various programs, see TAx INCENTIVES FOR EDU-
CATION, supra note 1, at 35-37. In general these programs are self descriptive, with grant
programs providing funds for college that do not have to be paid back, while loan programs
may provide for below-market rate loans, deferred payment terms, government guarantees, or
a combination of the foregoing. Id.
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plemental Educational Opportunity Grants are reserved for the neediest
students, while loan programs often saddle a student with a heavy debt
burden, especially if the student goes on to graduate or professional school."
Work study is simply inadequate to finance all but a small part of college
education, since the students work for minimum or near minimum wages.
12
Furthermore, changes in the federal income tax enacted as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated many of the tax advantages of tradi-
tional devices used for financing college education. The Clifford Trust was
eliminated, 3 and the unearned income of children under 14 is now taxed
at the parent's marginal tax rate.' 4 Consequently, subsequent to the 1986
Act, these devices are no longer as attractive to parents planning for future
college costs. 5 In addition, the deduction for interest paid on education
loans was phased out,'6 and portions of scholarships, such as room and
board grants, were made taxable for the first time.
7
As a result of the perceived inadequacy of federal programs and tax
laws, there has been a surge of activity at the state level to find new ways
to help parents and students finance college education. Two of the most
prominent of these state initiatives are a special type of state bond, some-
times termed a baccalaureate bond, and prepaid tuition plans. 8 Both of
these devices share a common aim-to remedy the present inadequacy in
11. For example, in 1984 graduating law students had incurred educational debt averaging
$20,000 to $30,000. The monthly payment on a debt of $25,000 would be in excess of $300
per month. ABA, SEC. OF LEoAL EDUC. AND ADMIssIoNS TO TnE BAR, Memorandum D8788-
88 at 3-4 (1988). These numbers have undoubtedly increased since 1984. For a general discussion
of the college debt burden, see HsEN, STUDENT LoANs: ARE TBsY OVERBURDENINO A
GENERATION? (College Board 1987).
12. See TAx INCENTvES FOR EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 35.
13. The Clifford Trust device enabled a parent to place property in a trust for a 10 year
or longer period with income payable to a child of the parent and a reversion to the parent
at the termination of the trust. The income would be taxed to the child at the child's
presumably lower tax rate. I.R.C. § 671 (1982).
14. See I.R.C. §§ l(i), 671 (1982 and Supp. IV. 1987) [hereinafter, references to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 will be to I.R.C. and section number unless otherwise indicated].
15. For a criticism of the Kiddie Tax and other aspects of the 1986 Act as they affect
higher education, see Philipps & Bullivant, The Ill-Effects of Mid-1980s Tax Policy on Higher
Education, 6 AXroN TAx J. 45 (1989).
16. See I.R.C. § 163(h),(d). These provisions phase out the deduction for personal interest
so that it is completely eliminated after 1990. For 1990, 10% of interest on education loans
is deductible. Id.
17. See I.R.C. § 117(b).
18. For summaries of various college financing devices, see Kenny, Establishing a
Program to Provide for College Cost Requires Careful Planning After TAMRA, TAx'N FOR
LAW. 56 (July/August 1989); Knight & Knight, New Ways to Arrange Tuition Costs, J. AcCT.
46 (March 1989). Some private universities also have experimented with prepaid tuition plans.
However, Duquesne University, a pioneer in the idea, recently was forced to suspend its plan.
Duquesne cited a lower than projected rate of return on the bonds used to underwrite the
plan and a need to raise tuition at a faster rate than originally forecast as reasons for the
suspension. Duquesne University Suspends Its Tuition Prepayment Plan, N.Y. Times, March
6, 1988, at p.28, col. 1.
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the saving rate for college costs.19 Their underlying idea is to provide
incentives for parents to save for college costs on a systematic basis.
Baccalaureate bonds are simply non-recallable, tax-exempt, zero coupon
bonds2 issued by states in such a way as to link them with saving for
higher education. This is accomplished by issuing the bonds in smaller
denominations than usual, making them non-recallable, and marketing them
to the public as being intended for college saving.2' For example, the Illinois
bond program issues bonds, marketed as college savings bonds, with ma-
turity values of 5,000 and maturity terms that range between five and twenty
years. An advertising brochure states that a sixteen year maturity bond can
be purchased for $1400.22 Illinois also promises a bonus of .4 percent interest
annually if the proceeds of the bonds actually are used for tuition at an
in-state institution of higher education. 23 Virginia issues bonds with maturity
values of $1000 or $5000, with terms of between five and twenty years and
interest rates of 6.7 to 7 percent. 24 Virginia advertised its bonds by including
in the state income tax packet a page detailing projected costs of college
education and explaining its bond program.25 Unlike the Illinois bonds,
19. The overall United States savings rate in 1986 was 3.8%. This compares to a savings
rate of 8.60o in 1975. During the 1980s the savings rate hovered in the 5%o to 6%o range.
STATE SAVING AND PREPAID TUITION PLANS, supra note 8, at 7. According to a 1984 survey,
about 50% of parents who expect their children to attend college save for that reason. Id.
(citing NORTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION FAcLITms, A NATIONAL STUDY
ON PARENTAL SAVINGS FOR CHILDREN'S HIGHER EDUCATION EXPENSES 10-11 (1984). The
following table summarizes the results of that survey:
Percent Now Median Amount
Saving Saved per year




Under $10,000 17% $120
$10,000-$19,999 45% $140
$20,000-$29,999 52% $466
$30,000 and over 70% $904
By Age of Children
Expected to Attend
College:
Under 13 5107 $443
Age 13-18 58% $500
STATE SAVING AND PREPAID TUITION PLANS, supra note 8, at 8.
20. A zero coupon bond is issued at a discount (i.e., a price below its face value at
maturity), and the difference between the amount paid by the investor for the bond and its
value at maturity represents the interest element on the bond.
21. See Making College Ends Meet: A Guide to Useful Tuition Tools, N.Y. Times, Nov.
5, 1989, at § 4A, p. 41, col. 1.
22. EDUC. COMM'N OF THE STATES, 1989 SURVEY OF COLLEGE SAVINGS AND GUARANTEED
TUITION PROGRAMS §§ I, IV (unpaginated 1989) [hereinafter 1989 SURwEY].
23. Id. § III.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 23-38.72 to .74 (Supp. 1989).
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Virginia's bonds offer no bonus if the proceeds are used for educational
purposes by the purchaser.26
Interest on baccalaureate bonds is tax free to the recipient under Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) section 103(a) because the receipts of the bond issue
are used for general public purposes by the states issuing them. 27 In this
respect baccalaureate bonds are no different than any other general obli-
gation bonds issued by a state and, hence, are entitled to the section 103
governmental interest exclusion. They are merely marketed as a college
savings device and issued as non-recallable zero coupon bonds in smaller
denominations than usual.
The tax treatment of baccalaureate bonds is, therefore, straightforward.
Interest on the bonds is excluded from federal gross income and normally
will be excluded from gross income for the state that issued the bonds.
Several states have adopted programs to issue baccalaureate bonds because
of their simplicity and tax advantages. 8
However, baccalaureate bonds are deficient in one important respect.
There is no guarantee that income from the investment will be sufficient to
fund college costs when the bonds mature. Indeed, the likelihood is that
the income from the investment will be insufficient to fund future college
costs of a purchaser of the bond.
The reason for this is that the historical real rate of return (return after
adjustment for general inflation) on tax-exempt securities is approximately
zero, while the rate of college cost inflation is projected to exceed the
general inflation rate in the foreseeable future by about two percent.
29
Therefore, a person investing in tax-exempt bonds to fund future college
costs would fall further behind those costs the longer that person held the
bond.3 0 The ultimate result is that baccalaureate bonds fail to protect against
the risk about which parents planning for their children's college education
are most concerned: college cost inflation. These bonds provide no assur-
ance, whatsoever, that the amounts invested will be sufficient to fund future
educational costs.
3 '
26. 1989 SURVEY, supra note 22, at § III.
27. See I.R.C. § 103(a); Rev. Rul. 73-112, 1973-1 C.B. 47.
28. As of June 1989, 15 states had adopted tax-exempt baccalaureate bond plans:
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. 1989 SURVEY,
supra note 22, at § I.
29. Anderson, Prepaying for Higher Education: Why it Works 7, 20 (paper presented
to the American Economics Association Dec. 29, 1988 and to the Brookings Institution Dec.
6, 1988) [hereinafter Prepaying for Higher Education]; Anderson, Tax Exempt College Savings
Bonds: Problems and Solutions, in STATES AND Ta BOND MARKETS: PROCEEDINGS OF A
NATIONAL ISSUES SEMINAR OF TItE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATRES 102-03 (1988).
30. Forum for College Financing Alternatives, College Savings and Prepayment Plans,
CAPITAL IDEAS Vol. 2, nos. 3, 4, p. 3 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter College Savings and Prepayment
Plans].
31. See Tax Incentives for Education Hearing, supra note 4, at 198-201 (Statement of
John D. Finnerty).
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:291
Tuition prepayment plans, by contrast, address inflation risk directly.
The basic idea is that in exchange for payment of a predetermined amount,
the sponsor of the plan promises to provide educational services in the
future, regardless of the cost of those services at the future time.
For a while prepayment plans looked like the wave of the future, as
they were adopted or considered in several states. 32 However, more recently
there have been second thoughts about prepayment plans, especially with
respect to their treatment under the federal income tax. Two private letter
rulings indicate that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) position with respect
to tuition prepayment plans may place such onerous tax burdens on them
that they simply will not be able to work as conceived.33 This article will
examine prepaid tuition plans, using the plan adopted by the state of
Michigan as a prototype, and discuss the IRS position with respect to tax
treatment of such plans. The article then will discuss possible alternatives
to the IRS position under present law and, finally, suggest enactment of
legislation to deal with the question.
II. Tm MIcmGAN PLAN
Michigan was the first state to enact legislation authorizing a prepaid
tuition plan, and its program has been a model for other state plans.3 4 The
Service issued a letter ruling on the Michigan Plan in 1988.11 This article
will focus on the Michigan Plan because there is more experience and
information available with respect to that plan than any other.
A. Structure of the Plan
The Michigan Plan is administered by a "public body corporate and
politic" designated the Michigan Education Trust (MET).3 6 MET is "within"
the state Department of Treasury but exercises its "statutory powers, duties,
and functions independently of the head of that department. 3 7 MET collects
32. See 1989 SURvEY, supra note 22, Summary; INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note
3, at 13. As of June 1989, nine states had tuition prepayment legislation on the books:
Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wyom-
ing. However, only Florida, Michigan, and Wyoming had actually implemented their plans.
1989 SuRvEY, supra note 22, at § III.
33. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (June 24, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-01-027 (Jan. 6,
1989).
34. Mich. Educ. Trust Act, P.A. 1986, No. 316, MIcH. Com. LAws ANN. § 390.1421-
390.1442 (West 1986) [hereinafter cited as MICH. LAws]. See STATE SAVING AND PEPAMD
TUITION PLANS, supra note 8, at 1.
35. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (June 24, 1988).
36. MIcH. LAWS § 390.1425.
37. Id. The state treasurer is, however, a member of MET's nine person board of
directors. Id. § 390.1430(1). The other eight members are appointed by the Governor. No
more than two of those eight members can be state officials or employees. Of the remaining
six members, one must be appointed from a list of nominees of the Senate Majority Leader
and one from a list of nominees of the House of Representatives Majority Leader, one must
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funds from purchasers of prepaid tuition contracts. The MET funds then
are invested by the state Department of the Treasury.
The funds can be pooled with other state investment funds for invest-
ment purposes, but they are not subject to use by the state for any other
purposes but MET's 8 This arrangement permits MET and its contract
purchasers to take advantage of the state's money management expertise
and the market power of the state's investment funds. At the same time it
protects MET's funds from the possibility that they may be used by the
state for purposes other than fulfillment of MET's contract obligations.
The plan, thereby, presents a substantial investment advantage to individual
contract purchasers who normally lack the market power and expertise for
sophisticated investment activity 9
MET has an assortment of plans and price structures. 40 The basic idea
for each is the same. In exchange for a payment by the contract purchaser,
MET agrees to provide a contracted amount of educational services to the
beneficiary of the contract at an in-state institution of higher education, no
matter what the cost of those services is when the beneficiary actually
attends college. 41 There is no guarantee, however, that a child will be
admitted to a state institution of higher education. The admission decision
remains with the individual institutions.
42
The MET contract also provides for a variety of payouts if the bene-
ficiary attends an in-state private institution or an out-of-state institution,
dies or becomes disabled before reaching college age, receives a scholarship,
or after reaching age 18 certifies that he43 does not plan to attend an
be a President of a state institution of higher education, one must be a President of a
community college, and one must be a representative of the interests of private in-state colleges
and universities, Id. The MET board is subject to the state open meeting law and the state
freedom of information act. Id. § 390.1430(5),(6). Moreover, the form of MET contracts must
be approved by the state administrative board. Id. § 390.1426(2).
38. Id. § 390.1429(1-4).
39. See Prepaying for Higher Education, supra note 29, at 9-11; infra text accompanying
notes 266-71.
40. The Full Benefits Plan provides in-state tuition at any public institution of higher
education in the state. The Limited Benefits Plan provides up to 105% of the weighted average
tuition costs at the state public four-year institutions. The Community College Plan provides
in-district tuition at any of the state' public community and junior colleges. MICH. DEP'T OF
TREAs., GUARANTEEING ToMoRRow's COLLEGE TUITION CosTs TODAY Q&A 7 at 3-4 (1988).
Under the most expensive Full Benefits Plan, the cost for a contract purchased for a child at
birth in 1988 was $1,689 per year for a total of $6,756 for four years. Id. Q&A 8 at 4. In
1989 the cost went up to $1,916 per year for a total of $7,664 for four years. Michigan
Applications Drop for Prepaid Tuition, Chicago Tribune Wire Service, Oct. 19, 1989.
41. MIcH. DEP'T OF TREAs., GUARANTEEING ToMoRROw's COLLEGE TUITION CosTs TODAY
Q&A 4 at 2 (1988).
42, See MIcH. LAWS § 390.1438, which states:
Nothing in this act or in [a Met] contract shall be construed as a promise or
guarantee by [MET] or the state that a person will be admitted to a state institution
of higher education or to a particular state institution of higher education.
43. In conformity with what the good nuns taught the author in grammar school, this
article will use the masculine pronoun when gender is indeterminate.
1990]
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institution of higher education." For the most part, in the absence of some
extraordinary event, such as death or disability of the beneficiary, the funds
used to purchase the contract cannot be reached by either the purchaser or
the beneficiary until the beneficiary reaches college age.45 Moreover, the
benefits of the contract are not transferable except in limited circumstances,
such as when a beneficiary decides not to attend college.
46
The statute also provides for an annual actuarial review of the MET
fund. MET will set future contract prices yearly to assure the actuarial
soundness of the fund in accordance with this annual review. 47 However,
there is no guarantee that the state will rescue MET should the fund for
some reason become unable to meet its obligations. 48 Nevertheless, such a
bailout is not precluded by the statute.
49
B. Letter Ruling 88-25-027
Under the terms of its enabling statute MET could not commence
issuing prepayment contracts until it received a ruling from IRS that the
contract purchaser would not be taxable on account of the prepayment
contract.50 Accordingly, MET, in 1986, and again in 1987, requested a
ruling from IRS that the plan would entail no tax consequences to the
purchaser of the contract, the beneficiary, or MET. MET took the position
that its contracts were similar to prepaid service contracts, such as one
purchases when one buys a new car and wants more than a basic warranty.
The car buyer can purchase an extended warranty whereby the seller
promises to provide certain services in the future. Because these prepaid
service contracts are not currently taxable, the argument went, then neither
should MET contracts entail tax consequences.
51
When the ruling was finally issued in March 1988, the good news for
MET was that IRS ruled the contract purchaser had no income tax conse-
44. Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract § 7. There is also provision
for transferring the contract to another beneficiary where the original beneficiary dies, becomes
disabled, drops out of high school, or reaches age 18 and certifies he does not plan to attend
an institution of higher education. Id. § 6.
45. Id. §§ 6, 7.
46. Id. § 6. In such cases the benefits can be transferred to an "immediate family
member," defined as a "spouse, child, stepchild, adopted child, grandchild, niece, nephew,
or ward of the Purchaser, or the brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the beneficiary."
Id. § 17.
47. MICH. LAWS § 390.1433(1); MICH. DEP'T OF TREAS., THF MET PROoRAM: A SuMAxRY
2 (1988). For 1988 and 1989 prices see supra note 40.
48. See MICH. LAWS § 390.1433(2); MICH. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE MET PROGRAM: A
SUMMARY 3 (1988).
49. See MICH. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE MET PROGRAM: A SUMMARY 3 (1988); MICH. LAWS
§ 390.1433(2).
50. MICH. LAW at § 390.1433(3). The statute also provides that amounts paid over to
MET are deductible for Michigan state income tax purposes, and that neither the purchaser
nor the beneficiary is taxable under the Michigan income tax on account of purchasing or
receiving benefits under a MET contract. See id. § 390.1435, § 390.1440.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 114-22.
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quences on account of purchasing the contract. The bad news was that IRS
found taxability just about everywhere else.1
2
The facts of the ruling are that A purchases a prepayment contract for
the benefit of B, an irrevocably designated beneficiary. The educational
benefits of the contract cannot be received by B until B matriculates. If
certain events occur and B does not matriculate, a refund is to be paid to
a secondary beneficiary, C. The refund to C may be only the amount paid
for the contract or an amount determined by reference to average tuition
charges at institutions covered by the contract, depending on the type of
contract purchased. 3 The ruling assumed that Michigan law does not impose
a legal obligation on a parent to provide a child with a college education .
4
1. Income Tax Treatment of Parent and Child
The ruling first considered the income tax results of purchasing the
contract to the purchaser A and the beneficiaries B and C. The Service
ruled that purchase of the contract is a gift by A to B and C and, therefore,
not includible in B and C's gross income under IRC section 102(a), which
excludes gifts from gross income. 55 Neither does the purchase of the contract
result in any income tax consequences to A, as A is simply making a gift.
5 6
The basis in the contract for B would be the donor A's basis, the price A
paid for the contract. If C receives a refund under the contract, C also
takes A's basis.5
7
Although the initial purchase of the contract does not result in gross
income to B or C, the receipt of benefits under the contract by B does
cause B to have gross income. The Service reasoned that the income from
gift property, in contrast to the gift property itself, is taxable to the donee. 8
Therefore, the difference between an allocated portion of B's basis in the
contract (the purchase price paid by A) and the value of the educational
services received by B during B's tax year is gross income to B in that
year.
5 9
For example, if A paid $6,000 for four years of tuition and the value
of one year's tuition is $2,500 when B receives the educational services, B
52. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (1988), reprinted in 11 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 54,969 (May
5, 1988). [hereinafter Ltr. Rul., with Prentice-Hall paragraph number]. A second ruling followed
Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 in January, 1989, essentially restating the position of the prior ruling.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-01-027 (Jan. 6, 1989). This was apparently a response to the Indiana
prepayment plan's request for a ruling.
53. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,986.
54. Id. For a discussion of the possibilities where such an assumption is not made, see
infra text accompanying notes 130-60.
55. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,986-87. See I.R.C. § 102(a), which provides that
"gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance."
56. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987.
57. Id. See also I.R.C. § 1015(a).
58. See Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987; I.R.C. § 102(b).
59. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987.
1990]
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has an income inclusion of $1,000 ($2,500 value of educational services
received minus $1,500 allocated portion of B's substituted basis of $6,000)
in the year that B receives the educational services.60 If C receives a refund
under the contract, C, likewise, has an income inclusion in the year of
receipt in the amount of the difference between the amount of the refund
and C's substituted basis in the contract. 61 However, the Service ruled that
A, the purchaser of the contract, has no income inclusion on account of
receipt of the educational services by B or receipt of a refund by C.62 The
purchaser A, therefore, has no income either when the contract is purchased
or when B or C receive benefits under the contract. Moreover, IRS ruled
that neither A, B, nor C has constructive receipt of income between the
date A purchases the contract and the date either B or C receives benefits
under the contract.63
2. Gift Tax Treatment of Parent
Although the purchaser A has no income tax consequences on account
of the contract, A does have gift tax consequences. The Service ruled that
the purchase of the contract is a taxable gift by A for federal gift tax
purposes because the payment of money by a taxpayer to a third party in
consideration of the third party's rendering services to a person designated
by the taxpayer is a taxable gift by the taxpayer to the designee.64 Moreover,
the gift is not subject to any rule of exclusion. The gift is not excludible
under the $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion because it is not a gift of a
present interest. 6 Nor is the gift excludible under the provision that excludes
from application of the gift tax amounts paid on behalf of an individual
to a qualified educational institution for the education or training of such
individual. The Service concluded that this provision is inapplicable because
the purchase price of the contract is paid to the Trust and not directly to
the institution that provides the educational services. 6
60. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6 (1960).
61. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also I.R.C. § 2501(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(3) (as amended in 1986).
65. See I.R.C. § 2503(b). The Service concluded that there is not a gift of a present
interest because the donee B's enjoyment of the educational services is delayed to some time
in the future. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,988.
66. Id. See also I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A). The Service elaborated on the gift tax conse-
quences in a later ruling, apparently addressed to the similar Indiana prepaid tuition plan. In
that ruling the IRS addressed the gift tax consequences where the purchaser A retains the right
to receive a refund on termination of the contract rather than giving the refund right to C,
and A also makes installment payments to the trust rather than paying the purchase price in
a lump sum. The Service ruled that A's retaining the right to a refund does not reduce the
amount of the taxable gift, because the value of the refund right is dependent on contingencies
so speculative as to make the value of that right unascertainable under generally accepted
valuation principles. The Service also held that payment of the gift in installments delays
completion of the taxable gift, and hence imposition of the gift tax, until the installment
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3. Income Tax Treatment of MET
The most surprising aspect of the ruling was the Service's position with
respect to income tax treatment of MET. The Service concluded that MET
is taxable on its investment income, despite MET's clear relationship to the
state government. The Service first held that MET is not an integral part
of state government because: 1) decisions by MET's board of directors
cannot be overridden by any state agency; 2) MET's funds are not derived
from the state or any state agency; 3) MET's funds are not subject to
claims of the state's creditors and "are not considered state money or
common cash of the state"; 4) the state may not loan, transfer or use
MET's funds for any purpose; and 5) MET's funds may only be used for
the provision of educational services or refunds authorized in the trust's
enabling legislation. 67 The Service then concluded that because MET is not
an integral part of state government, it cannot be exempt from taxation on
that ground.
68
Next IRS considered whether MET is exempt from income tax under
IRC section 115, which provides that gross income does not include income
that accrues to a state from "the exercise of any essential governmental
function."6 9 The Service asserted that section 115 requires that the income
not serve private interests such as designated individuals, shareholders, or
organizations. Therefore, in the Service's view, even if the income serves a
public interest, "the requirements of section 115 are not satisfied if the
income serves a private interest that is not incidental to the public interest.
' 70
The Service then addressed whether MET serves a private interest that
is not incidental to a public interest. The Service explained that MET
provides the beneficiary B with a direct economic benefit in the form of
educational services, the value of which is expected to be substantially in
excess of the initial payment for the contract. Furthermore, this benefit is
available only to those persons who are beneficiaries of prepaid tuition
contracts. Based on these facts, the Service determined that MET serves
private interests that are not incidental to the public interest. Therefore, the
Service concluded that MET's investment income is not exempt from income
tax under IRC section 115.
71
The Service left the precise manner in which MET is taxable undeter-
mined by the ruling. That is, is MET taxable as a subchapter C corporation,
payments are complete. The Service reached this conclusion because the terms of the contract,
as stated in the ruling, provide that if A defaults on the payments, the contract terminates,
and the amounts theretofore paid by A are to be refunded. Therefore, the gift is contingent
on A's making all the required payments and incomplete until A does so. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-
01-027 (Jan. 6, 1989).
67. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987.
68. Id.
69. I.R.C. § 115.
70. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987.
71. Id. However, IRS did concede that payments made under the contract by the
purchaser A are excludible from gross income of the trust. Id. at 54,987-88.
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as a simple trust, as a complex trust, or as some other entity such as a life
insurance company?
In summary, the IRS position is that the contract purchaser is subject
to gift tax but not income tax on account of purchase of the contract.
Moreover, the purchaser is not subject to income tax, either during the
term of the contract or when a beneficiary receives the educational benefits
or receives a refund. 72 However, a beneficiary who receives educational
benefits under the contract has gross income when he receives the benefits.
7
The amount of income is the difference between the fair market value of
the educational services received by the beneficiary and an allocated portion
of the beneficiary's basis in the contract. The beneficiary's basis in the
contract is a substituted basis from the purchaser-the price paid by the
purchaser for the contract. Likewise, if either a beneficiary or the purchaser
receives a refund, that person has gross income in the amount of the
difference between the amount of the refund and his basis in the contract.
Finally, the MET is subject to tax on its investment income in some way
undefined by the ruling.
C. Competing Analyses Under Existing Law
There are currently no Internal Revenue Code provisions that deal
specifically with prepaid tuition plans. The Service, in Letter Ruling 88-25-
027, relied on broad code sections such as section 61, defining gross income,
and general doctrines such as constructive receipt and intergovernmental
immunity. Although IRS makes a plausible case for its position in the
ruling, other equally or more plausible conclusions could result under
existing law by using any of several competing analyses.
There are basically three potential taxpayers in a prepaid contract
arrangement: 1) the purchaser of the contract (Parent); 2) the beneficiary
of the contract (Child); and 3) the contract provider (MET).74 The first
question is which, if any, of these potential taxpayers is actually subject to
tax under existing law. A second question is when is the tax imposed.
7 5
1. Income Tax Treatment of Parent and Child
There are several plausible income tax outcomes under current law for
Parent and Child. They all depend in some degree upon analogies with the
income tax treatment of other more familiar transactions.
72. The purchaser is, of course, taxable if a refund is paid to him and the amount of
the refund exceeds the purchaser's basis in the contract. Id. at 54,987.
73. The beneficiary does not have gross income from the contract during its term. The
contract's restrictive refund features prevent the beneficiary from being in constructive receipt
of any income during that time. Id.
74. A parent need not be the purchaser of a prepaid tuition contract and a child of the
purchaser need not be the beneficiary. However, parent/purchaser and child/beneficiary is the
most common arrangement. Hence, for simplicity, the remainder of this article will refer to
the purchaser as Parent and the beneficiary as Child. The analysis will also assume that Parent
is entitled to any refund under the contract.
75. See Statement of Professor Leo J. Raskind, University of Minnesota Law School,
in INvrrATioNAL CoNFERENcE, supra note 3, at 40.
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a. Time-Value of Money
The transaction between Parent and MET might be subjected to eco-
nomic analysis utilizing time-value of money or present value concepts. 76
Using such an analysis, the transaction can be analogized to a loan from
Parent to MET, with MET agreeing to repay the loan with interest by
providing educational benefits to Child in the future. The difference between
the value of the educational services furnished to Child and the amount of
the "loan" would constitute economic income to Parent under familiar
time-value of money principles. Concomitantly, Parent would be considered
as making a gift of the value of the educational services to Child. The
economic effect is the same as if Parent lent the contract price to MET at
market interest, and Parent reinvested MET's interest payments in the
contract. Under a strictly economic analysis, Parent has income as the
unstated interest element of the contract accrues.
Three provisions in the 1984 Act, IRC section 7872 (below market
interest loans), section 467 (payments for the use of property or services),
and sections 1271-75 (original issue discount) conceivably could apply to
prepaid tuition contracts. Nevertheless, there are strong arguments, based
on both statutory analysis and legislative history, that none is applicable.
Moreover, even if one or more of the time-value of money provisions were
applicable, they may be overridden by the IRC section 103 state bond
interest exclusion.
(1) Below Market Interest Loan
Analysis of the relevant Code provisions indicates that none of them
readily applies to the prepaid tuition situation. The first IRC provision that
might apply is section 7872. This section imposes the income tax when a
lender lends a borrower money at no interest or at a below-market interest
rate. The provision accomplishes this result by imputing a transfer of the
foregone interest from the lender to the borrower and then imputing a
retransfer of that amount from the borrower to the lender as an interest
payment. For example, applied to the prepaid tuition case, IRC section
7872 would impute a transfer by Parent to MET of an amount equivalent
to the foregone interest, and a retransfer of that same amount from MET
76. The term "time-value of money" refers to the economic fact that receipt of a dollar
today has greater value than receipt of a dollar at some future time. For example, the right
to receive one thousand dollars one year in the future is presently worth only about $909,
assuming a 10% interest rate. That is, $909 invested today at a 10% interest rate will grow
to $1,000 in one year. See A. AicHmIA & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION,
COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 107-31 (3d ed. 1983). The fundamental premises of the I.R.C.'s
time-value of money rules are: 1) parties dealing at arm's length provide compensation for the
use of money in every deferred payment transaction; 2) this compensation should normally be
treated as taxable income to the creditor; and 3) this interest should be allocated to tax years
on a constant interest basis.
77. See I.R.C. § 7872(a).
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to Parent. The transfer by Parent to MET would be characterized as an
additional tuition payment. The imputed retransfer from MET to Parent
would be characterized as a payment of interest income to Parent.
The difficulty with applying IRC section 7872 in this instance is that
the words of the statute simply do not fit the case. Section 7872 applies to
three specific categories and to two broad residual classes of loans: 1) gift
loans, e.g., loans from a parent to a child; 2) employment related loans,
e.g., loans from an employer to an employee; 3) corporation-shareholder
loans, e.g., loans from a corporation to a shareholder; 4) loans one of the
principal purposes of which is the avoidance of any federal tax; and 5) to
the extent provided in regulations, any below-market loan not included in
one of the first four categories to the extent that the interest arrangements
have a significant effect on the federal tax liability of the lender or
borrower.
78
Of these five categories, the first three are patently inapplicable. There
is no gift of foregone interest between Parent and MET; nor are Parent
and MET in an employer-employee or corporation-shareholder relationship.
The only categories that could possibly apply are the fourth and fifth. The
fourth category-a principal purpose of the loan is tax avoidance-is
obviously a fact and circumstance issue. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see
how a principal purpose of MET contracts is tax avoidance. Granted, there
were anticipated tax benefits when MET was created, and the MET legis-
lation was conditioned on a favorable IRS ruling with respect to income
tax consequences to Parent.7 9 Still, income tax consequences, though im-
portant, are incidental to the principal purposes of MET and its clients.
These purposes are spelled out in the MET legislation itself as promoting
state institutions of higher education and advancing the education of the
state's citizenry.80
The fifth category is a catch-all provision that authorizes Treasury to
issue regulations applying section 7872 to "any below-market loan ... if
the interest arrangements of such loan have a significant effect on any
Federal tax liability of the lender or the borrower."'" Treasury has issued
temporary regulations under this provision that exempt several classes of
transactions from application of section 7872. Among the class of exempted
loans are "[loans which are made available by the lender to the general
public on the same terms and conditions and which are consistent with the
lender's customary lending practice. ' 8 2 MET makes its contracts available
to the general public on equal terms and conditions in accordance with its
normal business practices. Hence, MET fits within the regulations' excep-
tion. Apparently, therefore, section 7872 does not apply to MET contracts.
78. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(I)(A),(B),(C),(D),(E). A sixth category, irrelevant to this discussion,
includes certain loans to continuing care facilities. Id. § 7872(c)(1)(F).
79. See MICH. LAWS § 390.1433(3).
80. Id. at § 390.1423.
81. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(E).
82. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-ST(b)(l) (as amended in 1986).
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(2) Payment for Use of Property or Services
A second possibly applicable Code provision is IRC section 467. That
section deals mainly with proper recognition of the interest component of
a payment where a lease calls for deferred payment of rent."3 However,
both the legislative history and the statute itself indicate that Treasury has
authority to issue regulations applying the section to advance payments and
to payments for services. "The Conference Report states, "Regulations will
also deal with the treatment of front-loaded (i.e. prepaid) agreements.""5
This language indicates that Treasury has authority to issue regulations
applying IRC section 467 to prepaid tuition contracts because the contracts
are readily characterized as advance payments for educational services.
However, the actual wording of the statute is more restrictive than the
broad language of the Conference Report. Section 467(f) confers upon
Treasury authority to issue regulations applying section 467 "in the case of
any agreement where the amount paid under the agreement for the use of
property decreases during the term of the agreement."81 6 That is, Treasury's
authority under this subsection is limited to issuance of regulations applying
section 467 to prepayment of rent, not prepayment for services.
The statute does give Treasury authority in subsection (g) to issue
regulations applying section 467 to payments for services.87 However, the
language of subsection (g) appears to authorize only regulations applying
section 467 to deferred, not prepaid, payments for services. Subsection (g)
authorizes regulations applying rules "comparable to the rules of subsection
(a)(2)' 9s8 to "payments for services which meet requirements comparable to
the requirements of subsection (d)." 9 Subsection 467(d), in turn, applies to
83. See I.R.C. § 467(a)-(e).
84. See I.R.C. § 467(f),(g); H. R. RP. No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 895, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADrniN. NEWS 1445, 1583.
85. H.R. REP. No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 895, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONo.
& ADnmN. NEWS 1445, 1583.
86. I.R.C. § 467(f) (emphasis added).
87. See I.R.C. § 467(g), which provides in relevant part:
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, rules comparable to the rules of
subsection (a)(2) shall also apply in the case of payments for services which meet
requirements comparable to the requirements of subsection (d).
Id.
88. Id. I.R.C. § 467(a)(2) provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) In the case of a lessor or lessee under any section 467 rental agreement, there
shall be taken into account the sum of (1) ... and (2) the sum of the interest for
the year on the amounts which were taken into account under this subsection for
prior taxable years and which were unpaid.
Id.
89. I.R.C. § 467(g). I.R.C. § 467(d) provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) IN oaENAL-[The term "section 467 rental agreements" means any rental agree-
ment for the use of tangible property under which-
(A) there is at least one amount allocable to the use of property during a calendar
year which is to be paid after the close of the calendar year following the calendar
year in which such use occurs, or
(B) there are increases in the amount to be paid as rent under the agreement.
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deferred payments, not prepayments. Section 467(d)(1)(B) applies to cases
where there are "increases in the amount to be paid ... under the
agreement," not to prepayments.9
In addition, section 467(d)(2) provides that the section does not apply
to transactions in which the aggregate amount of payments does not exceed
$250,000.91 Manifestly, aggregate payments on each prepaid tuition contract
do not exceed $250,000. Hence, section 467 is inapplicable to prepaid tuition
contracts by reason of this provision alone.
Finally, Treasury has not yet issued any regulations under authority of
subsections 467(f) and (g). The Conference report indicates that such re-
gulations are to be issued on a prospective basis only.92 Apparently, there-
fore, IRC section 467 does not apply to prepaid tuition contracts.
(3) Original Issue Discount
Conceivably, the original issue discount provisions of the Code also
might apply. 93 These provisions govern debt instruments issued at a discount,
defined as the difference between the issue price of the instrument and the
redemption price at maturity.94 If these rules apply to MET contracts, the
issue price would be the price paid by Parent for the contract and the
redemption price at maturity would be the value of the educational services
received by Child. The redemption price at maturity would, therefore, be
contingent on the value of educational services received by Child. Regula-
tions to govern the contingent payment situation have been proposed. These
regulations require that the discount element be taken into income by the
owner in the year that the payments become fixed.95 Applying this analysis
to MET, Parent would be taxable in the years the educational services are
rendered on the difference between the purchase price (issue price) of the
contract and the value of the educational services when rendered (redemption
price at maturity).
The question remains, however, whether these rules apply. The operative
provision, IRC section 1272, applies to "any debt instrument." 96 The issue
90. I.R.C. § 467(d)(1)(B).
91. I.R.C. § 467(d)(2) provides in relevant part as follows:
This section shall not apply ... if the sum of the following amounts does not
exceed $250,000-
(A) the aggregate amount of payments received as consideration ... , and
(B) the aggregate value of any other consideration to be received....
I.R.C. § 467(d)(2)(A),(B).
92. H.R. REP. No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 895, reprinted in 1984 U.S.CoDE CoNo.
& ADmN. NEws 1445, 1583. The conference report states:
The conferees intend that the provisions relating to deferred payment services
agreements and front-loaded agreements and the regulations thereunder be applied
prospectively from the date of issuance of regulations.
Id.
93. See I.R.C. §§ 1271-75.
94. See I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1).
95. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(e)(3), 51 Fed. Reg. 12091 (1986).
96. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(1).
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then becomes whether a prepaid tuition contract is a debt instrument.
Section 1275 defines a debt instrument as a "bond, debenture, note, or
certificate or other evidence of indebtedness. ' 97 The proposed regulations
attempt to place a broad gloss on the statute by defining debt instrument
as including "all rights to deferred payments under a contract whether or
not evidenced by a formal instrument. " 98 Although prepaid tuition contracts
conceivably may fit under this definition by a strained reading, they do not
appear to be the kind of instrument to which the original issue discount
provisions are addressed. Prepaid tuition contracts are essentially agreements
for provision of future services by the issuer of the contract. They are not
debt instruments in any ordinary sense. In this regard it is noteworthy that
IRS did not attempt to apply section 1272 in Letter Ruling 88-25-027. 99
(4) Legislative History
Finally, the legislative history of the 1984 Tax Reform Act time-value
of money provisions1 °0 presents a persuasive argument that Congress did
not intend for Parent to be taxed under time-value of money analysis in
the prepaid tuition situation. The 1984 Act, enacted after extensive con-
gressional consideration, created a comprehensive statutory framework for
dealing with a set of income measurement problems that concerned the
prior law's inadequacies in taking account of the time-value of money. The
Treasury presented testimony to Congress concerning time-value of money
during hearings prior to enactment of the legislation. That testimony,
presented by Treasury's Acting Tax Legislative Counsel, covered a broad
range of time-value of money problems and offered several examples of
possible areas for congressional action. Among those examples was the
following:
Rather than charging Parent tuition of $5,000 in 1985, College
will accept $4,000 in 1983. Because College can earn $1,000 on the
$4,000 over the two years without incurring any income tax liability,
it is indifferent between $4,000 today and $5,000 in 1985. Parent
97. I.R.C. § 1275(a)(1)(A).
98. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 12084 (1986).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 50-73. I.R.C. § 1273(b)(5) does provide that the
original issue discount provisions can apply to debt instruments issued in exchange for services,
as well as debt instruments issued for property or money. Id. However, Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1274-1(a)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 12063 (1986), would make the original issue discount provisions
inapplicable to debt instruments issued in exchange for services and refers to I.R.C. § 467.
See B. Brrr.ER & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4-64
n. 203 (5th ed. 1987). Moreover, I.R.C. § 1273(b)(5) pertains to the nature of the consideration
that can be given in exchange for a debt instrument, not to the definition of "debt instrument,"
nor to the form that interest payable under a debt instrument can take. I.R.C. § 1273(b)(5)
simply does not address the question whether a contract that provides for provision of
educational services in the future qualifies as a debt instrument under I.R.C. § 1275(a)(1)(A).
100. See I.R.C. §§ 461, 467, 483, 1271-78, 7872, enacted or as amended by Tax Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
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is not indifferent, however. If he invested the $4,000 for two years,
he would owe tax on the $1,000 earned. . . In effect, the arrange-
ment allows College to invest Parent's $4,000 and apply the tax-
free earnings to Parent's tuition obligation, without subjecting Par-
ent to tax on those earnings.10'
The similarities between MET and Treasury's example are obvious. Hence,
Treasury specifically had called prepaid tuition transactions to Congress'
attention prior to enactment of the comprehensive 1984 time-value of money
legislation.
Prepaid tuition contracts do not fit readily under any of the conceivably
applicable 1984 Act provisions targeted to time-value of money problems.
IRC sections 467 and 7872 are patently inapplicable, 0 2 and the original
issue discount provisions can apply only under a very strained reading of
the statute.103 It is significant that Congress, in the 1984 Act, dealt with
myriad time-value of money problems, but failed to address prepaid tuition
contracts specifically, even though Treasury explicitly had called such trans-
actions to Congress' attention.' °4 The most reasonable conclusion from this
is that Congress intended that prepaid tuition contracts not be subjected to
time-value of money analysis for income tax purposes.
Prior to the 1984 Act, interest-free and below-market interest loans were
held not to result in taxable income to the borrower or the lender. 05 The
1984 Act changed this result in certain cases. For transactions to which the
provisions of the 1984 Act do not apply, the case law result of non-taxability
should continue to apply.
(5) State Bond Interest Exclusion
Even assuming prepaid tuition contracts are susceptible to time-value
of money analysis under present law, one might argue that the "interest"
on the "loan" from Parent to MET is not taxable under IRC section 103,
which generally excludes from gross income interest paid on state-owed
obligations. Interest on a state obligation may be excluded under section
103, even though it is not evidenced by a formal note or bond. An obligation
101. Abusive Tax Shelters, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Internal
Revenue Service of the Senate Finance Comm. 106, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1983) (Statement
of Robert G. Woodward, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury Department).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 77-92.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
105. See, e.g., Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979), aff'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th
Cir. 1982); Suttle v. Commissioner, 1978-393 T.C.M., aff'd, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980);
Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961);
Bilter, Interest-Free Loans-Boon or Bust, 37 U. So. CAL. INsT. ON FED. TAX. 23 (1985);
Hartigan, From Dean and Crown to the Tax Reform Act of 1984: Taxation of Interest-Free
Loans, 60 NOTRE DAV:E L. REv. 31 (1984); Note, Recent Developments Affecting the Income
and Gift Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans, 40 WAsa. & LEE L. REv. 1685 (1983).
PREPAID COLLEGE TUITION PLANS
evidenced by an ordinary sales agreement can qualify for the exclusion.' °6
Under this analysis Parent would be treated for income tax purposes the
same as a purchaser of a tax-exempt zero coupon state baccalaureate bond.107
Thus, Parent's "interest" income would be excluded from gross income
under section 103.
Equivalent tax treatment for purchasers of tax-exempt zero coupon
baccalaureate bonds and prepaid tuition contracts makes logical sense be-
cause the two are functionally similar. In both cases a taxpayer is placing
money with the state in anticipation of future college expenses. Parity
treatment for both transactions would be fair and would prevent the form
of the transaction from controlling its taxability. However, under existing
law, the arbitrage provisions'08 of the IRC might, under some circumstances,
prevent such treatment in the case of prepaid tuition plans like MET's.
The reason is that MET reinvests the proceeds of the contracts in
securities rather than using them directly for public purposes. Generally,
arbitrage bonds are bonds whose proceeds may be used to acquire invest-
ments producing a materially higher yield than the yield on the bonds
themselves."09 Should MET's reinvestment run afoul of the arbitrage pro-
visions, the "interest" would not be entitled to the section 103 exclusion." 0
Whether the arbitrage provisions actually apply would depend on the
relationship between the "interest" paid on the contract (presumably the
difference between tuition value and price paid by Parent) and MET's
investment earnings."' If MET's investment earnings were sufficiently high
in relation to the "interest" paid Parent, the section 103 exclusion would
be inapplicable."
2
Finally, the exclusion would be defeated if the Service established that
MET is not part of the state because the state bond interest exclusion only
applies to interest on debt owed by a state or political subdivision.'
b. Contract for Educational Services
The MET contract might be viewed as a contract between MET and
Parent for future educational services." 4 That is, in exchange for a payment
106. See Commissioner v. Meyer, 104 F. 2d. 155 (2d. Cir. 1939) (interest on notes given
by state for purchase price of land); Rev. Rul. 60-179, 1960-1 C.B. 37. (interest paid by state
in connection with purchase of house on state owned property).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 20-31.
108. See I.R.C. § 148(a)-(f).
109. See I.R.C. § 148(a),(b). A detailed discussion of arbitrage bonds is beyond the scope
of this article.
110. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(2), which provides that the state bond interest exclusion shall
not apply to "[a]ny arbitrage bond (within the meaning of section 148)." Id.
111. Id.
112. See I.R.C. §§ 103(b)(2), 148(a)-(b).
113. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(a),(b) (1972). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 175-94 for a discussion of MET's status as a part of state government.
114. The MET enabling statue is phrased in terms of a contract for services. The statute
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of money by Parent, MET undertakes to provide for Child's education in
the future. Viewed this way, there are no tax results to either Parent or
Child upon Parent's purchase of the contract. Parent simply is making a
purchase, perhaps at a bargain, and a bargain purchase normally is not a
taxable event. 1 5
In addition, there is no taxable income during the term of the contract.
First, there is no realization event." 6 Second, neither Parent nor Child is
in constructive receipt of the income earned on MET's investments. A
taxpayer does not constructively receive income "if the taxpayer's control
of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.""' 7 Access
to the funds paid to MET and any earnings on those funds is severely
restricted for both Parent and Child. A refund is payable only if Child
dies, becomes disabled, is not admitted to a state higher education institu-
tion, or certifies after reaching college age that he does not plan to attend
requires that MET contracts provide for:
The assumption of a contractual obligation by [MET] to the qualified beneficiary
on its own behalf and on behalf of the state to provide for credit hours of higher
education, not to exceed the credit hours required for the granting of a baccalaureate
degree, at any state institution of higher education to which the qualified beneficiary
is admitted.
MicH. LAWS § 390.1426(l)(h).
The character of the MET contract as a service contract is reinforced by statutory author-
ization for MET to meet its contractual obligations in any appropriate manner, not merely by
making a monetary payment of an individual beneficiary's tuition bill. The statute authorizes
MET to:
make any arrangements that are necessary or appropriate with state institutions of
higher education in order to fulfill its obligations under [MET] contracts, which
arrangements may include, but need not be limited to, the payment by [MET] of
the then actual in-state tuition cost on behalf of a qualified beneficiary to the state
institution of higher education.
MicH. LAWS § 390.1426(3) (emphasis added).
For example, MET may arrange with a state institution for payment of a lump sum
discounted payment in exchange for the institution's provision of educational services to all
of MET's beneficiaries attending that institution.
115. See Husted v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 664, 673 (1967); Pellar v. Commissioner, 25
T.C. 299 (1955), acq. 1956-1 C.B. 5; Hunley v. Commissioner, 1966-66 T.C.M.; I B. BITTKER
& L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATEs AND GIFrs 5-78 (2d ed. 1989). In Pellar
the court stated:
[T]here can be no doubt that the general rule is that the purchase of property for
less than its value does not, of itself, give rise to the realization of taxable income.
25 T.C. at 309.
Although a bargain purchase does not normally result in taxable income to the purchaser,
the bargain element may be taxed if the seller intends to confer some economic benefit on the
purchaser by means of the transaction. For example, an employee who makes a bargain
purchase from an employer will be taxed on the bargain element of the purchase (except for
qualified employee discounts excludible under I.R.C. § 132(a)(2)), because the transaction is a
means of compensating the employee for services rendered to the employer. See Treas. Reg.
1.61-2(d) (as amended in 1979).
116. See B. BrrTKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 115, at 5-15 to 5-21.
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979).
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a state higher education institution. 118 Furthermore, in the event of a refund,
Child effectively is prevented from again participating in the MET program
because no refund can be granted until Child reaches college age (except
for death or disablement). After a refund, MET's rules prevent Child from
further participation." 9 These restrictions are substantial enough to prevent
either Parent or Child from receiving any income during the term of the
contract. 120
Finally, there should be no income tax consequence when Child receives
educational services under the contract. The mere receipt of performance
under a service contract does not constitute a taxable event, even though
the services received are worth more than the price of the contract. A
bargain purchase of services is no more a realization event than is a bargain
purchase of property.' 2' For example, if a lawyer contracts with a client to
perform legal services for a flat fee of $10,000, there is no income realization
to the client if the services turn out to be worth $25,000 at the lawyer's
hourly rate. The client simply has made a good bargain.
Similar situations readily come to mind: a customer who buys a service
contract in connection with purchase of an automobile does not realize
gross income when the car's engine blows up and the dealer replaces it,
even though the service contract costs less than the value of the repair; a
member of a health maintenance organization (HMO) does not realize gross
income when the HMO performs a costly heart transplant operation on the
member, even though the premium paid to the HMO is less than the value
of the operation; a person who purchases a four year health club membership
in year one does not realize gross income when that person uses the club's
facilities in year four, even though membership in year four may be more
expensive for new members. In addition, a person who buys a four year
118. See MicH. LAws § 390.1428(1); Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract
§ 7(b).
119. See Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract Enrollment and Price
Schedule. A qualified beneficiary must either be in school or be so young as not to have
started his education. There is one conceivable way to participate in the program a second
time, but it requires the beneficiary to drop out of high school before graduation, reenter
school, and then reenroll in MET. This is not a likely occurrence.
120. See Cohen v. Commissioner 39 T.C. 1055 (1963); Griffith v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
882 (1961) (taxpayer not in constructive receipt of insurance policy cash surrender value,
because taxpayer would have to surrender investment in policy to receive that income); Estate
of Berry v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1254 (1941); Knapp v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 23
(1940) (employee's right to withdraw amounts from employer trust account restricted because
after withdrawal employee could not again participate in fund); Rev. Rul. 82-121, 1982-1 C.B.
79; Rev. Rul. 80-300, 1980-2 C.B. 165 (employee not in constructive receipt of increased value
of stock appreciation rights, because to cash in on those rights employee would have to
relinquish the valuable right to share in further appreciation); Rev. Rul. 58-230, 1958-1 C.B.
204 (requirement of six month suspension from employer's profit-sharing plan as substantial
restriction preventing constructive receipt).
121. See supra note 115. In Gen. Couns. Mem. 35914 (1974) the Service cited Pellar v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 299 (1955), as authority for finding no gross income upon a bargain
purchase of a service contract.
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magazine subscription does not receive taxable income because the cost of
the magazine increases during the term of the subscription over the price
he paid for the subscription. In each of these instances there is no income
realization, despite the fact that the value of the services received exceeds
the price paid for them. Similarly, when a prepaid tuition contract is viewed
as a contract for future educational services, there is no realization event
upon receipt of those services, even though the educational services are
worth more than the price of the contract.122
c. Annuity
The MET transaction is also similar to purchase of an annuity by Parent
with Child as beneficiary. Under this analogy, Parent would be considered
as making a gift to Child in the amount of the purchase price of the
contract. Consequently, neither Parent nor Child recognizes gross income
when Parent purchases the contract. Nor does either have gross income in
the interim between purchase of the contract and the time benefits are
received under the contract. When educational benefits are received by Child
(the contract "payout"), Child is taxable under the annuity rules of IRC
section 72. Under these rules, Child has gross income in the year educational
services are received under the contract in an amount equal to the difference
between the value of educational services received during the year (the return
under the contract) and a prorata portion of the contract purchase price
(investment in the contract).
2 3
The annuity analogy produces tax results similar to the Service's con-
clusions in Letter Ruling 88-25-027. Moreover, there are factual similarities
between the MET contract and a traditional annuity. An annuity generally
is thought of as a contract which calls for equal periodic cash payments to
be made over a given future time period, often (but not necessarily) the
annuitant's lifetime. These payments ordinarily are made in consideration
of an up-front premium paid in a lump sum or in installments.17 The MET
contract resembles such an arrangement in that MET promises to provide
a valuable benefit at some time in the future in exchange for an advance
payment. Still, IRS did not rely on section 72 in Letter Ruling 88-25-027.'7
The Service may have disregarded section 72 because the MET contract,
despite some factual similarities to an annuity arrangement, does not seem
to fall within the requirements for section 72 to apply. The regulations
require that, in order to be taxed under section 72 as "amounts received
122. The MET contract might also be analogized to an option contract. Under this
analogy, when Child receives educational services under the contract Parent is considered as
exercising the option. Mere exercise of a non-compensatory option contract is not a taxable
event. See Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-2 C.B. 331.
123. See I.R.C. § 72(a),(b),(c).
124. See M. CamrEs~mN, FEDERAL INcom TAxArioN: A LAw STUDENT's GUmE TO THE
LEADiNo CASES AND CONCEPTS 33 (5th ed. 1988); J. Warnick & B. Ellis, Private Annuities A-
1, 195-3d TAx Mir. (BNA) (1984).
125. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
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as an annuity," payments: 1) must be received on or after the annuity
starting date; 2) must be payable in periodic installments at regular intervals;
and 3) except in the special case of a variable annuity, the total amount
payable must be determinable at the annuity starting date, either directly
under the terms of the contract, or indirectly by use of mortality tables or
compound interest computations. 26
It is difficult to fit the MET contract within the latter two requirements.
First, although the benefits received under MET are periodic, they need not
be at regular intervals. A student has the option of receiving benefits under
the contract sporadically over a period of several years. 27 Second, the total
amount payable is not determinable when Child begins receiving benefits
under the contract. For example, a child may transfer to a cheaper school
after starting at a more expensive one, or may drop out after completing
more than half the credit hours needed for a degree. Both of these
contingencies affect the total amount payable under the contract.
Finally, the MET contract does not appear to come within the variable
annuity exception to the requirement that the total payments under the
contract be determinable. To qualify for this exception, the contract must
provide that amounts are to be received for a definite or determinable
period of time and that the amount of periodic payments "may vary in
accordance with investment experience. . ., cost of living indices, or similar
fluctuating criteria."' n Benefits under MET contracts may not be received
for a definite or determinable period of time, since they can be received
over an extended time period of Child's choice. Furthermore, even if a
MET contract meets the determinable time period requirement, it still does
not meet the second requirement. Although benefits under the MET contract
can vary, they do not vary in accordance with investment experience of
MET, a cost of living index, or any similar criterion. The value of benefits
under the MET contract basically depends upon the cost of tuition at the
school Child attends.
Therefore, the analogy of MET to an annuity, while at first blush
appealing, misses the mark upon analysis of section 72's requirements.
Probably, this is the reason IRS ignored section 72 in Letter Ruling 88-25-
027.129
d. Grantor Trust
The MET contract also bears similarities to a grantor trust. In a trust
arrangement Parent generally transfers property to a trust with Child as
income beneficiary. Parent intends that Child use the trust income to finance
Child's college education. Similarly, under a MET contract Parent transfers
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4(b)(2) (as amended in 1986).
127. Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract §§ 2(a), 4(b), 8(b).
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-2(b)(3)(i)(a) (as amended in 1966).
129. The Service similarly ignored I.R.C. § 72 in Ltr. Rul. 89-01-027. See supra note 66.
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cash to MET with the intention that the amount transferred will fund
Child's future college education.
If Parent transfers property to a trust and retains no strings over the
property, such as a right to revoke or a reversion, the trust income will be
taxable to Child, not to Parent. However, if Parent retains certain strings
over the property, the trust income will be taxable to Parent under the
Code's grantor trust rules.1 30 There is no doubt that the MET contract
precludes most of the strings that might trigger the grantor trust rules.
Parent has no authority over the funds paid to MET and has no power to
revoke the contract."' However, MET undertakes to provide education to
Parent's Child, and Parent can retain the right to receive a refund in the
event the contract is terminated. Each of these features arguably could
trigger the grantor trust rules under some circumstances.
(1) Payment of Support Obligation
The first grantor trust provision that might require an income inclusion
by Parent is IRC section 677(b). This provision imposes taxability upon the
grantor of a trust whose income actually is applied to meet the grantor's
legal obligation of support. 32 The rationale is that the grantor is essentially
in constructive receipt of a trust distribution to the extent that the proceeds
satisfy the grantor's obligation of support or maintenance. 33  However,
income is taxed only to the extent that sums actually are expended to meet
the grantor's legal support obligation.
34
The applicability of IRC section 677(b) to the MET contract was not
an issue in Letter Ruling 88-25-027, because the ruling assumed that Parent
130. See I.R.C. §§ 671-679. These provisions apply to transfers in trust. This discussion
will assume that the MET contract transaction qualifies as a trust arrangement covered by the
grantor trust rules if the terms of those provisions are otherwise fulfilled. There is doubt,
however, about whether the MET contract does in fact represent a trust arrangement for
federal income tax purposes. See infra text a&ompanying notes 237-39.
131. Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract § 7. A contract can be
terminated upon written request when: 1) the beneficiary has reached 18 years of age or has
received a high school diploma and certifies that he will either, a) attend an independent
degree granting institution of higher education and directs payment to that institution; b) will
attend an out-of-state institution of higher education; or e) will attend a college or university
under a scholarship; 2) the beneficiary dies or is disabled; 3) the beneficiary has reached 18
years of age or has received a high school diploma and certifies that he, a) does not plan to
attend an institution of higher education; or b) will attend an independent institution of higher
education, but does not direct payment to that institution; or c) will attend a community or
junior college; or 4) MET approves a termination for any other reason. Id.
132. See I.R.C. § 677(b).
133. See Treas. Reg. 1.677(a)-l(c),(d) (as amended in 1971).
134. See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.677(b)-l(a) (as amended in 1971). I.R.C. § 677(a) imposes
taxability upon the grantor of a trust whose income may be applied to meet a legal obligation.
This subsection is distinguished from § 677(b), because the income does not actually have to
be expended for § 677(a) to apply, and the legal obligations covered by § 677(a) do not include
support obligations. The grantor is taxed under § 677(a) as the owner of the trust property if
the income may be applied in discharge of a legal obligation. See infra text accompanying
notes 150-52.
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was not under a legal support obligation to provide Child a college edu-
cation. 3 Nevertheless, the issue remains problematic where such an as-
sumption is not made, and current law is far from clear on the existence
and extent of a parent's obligation to provide a child with a college
education. For that reason, this article includes a discussion of the possible
application of IRC section 677(b) to prepaid tuition contracts such as the
MET contract.
Neither the Code nor the regulations offer any guidance in determining
what is a legal support obligation for purposes of IRC section 677(b).
Instead, resolution of this issue depends upon state law. 136 Under state law,
the scope of the parental obligation to support, and more specifically to
provide a college education, is often so vague that it is difficult to determine
whether a certain payment fulfills a parent's legal obligation or merely
provides the child with a benefit that the grantor is not legally required to
provide. 37 There is wide variation among the states as to who is obligated
and who is a dependent. 3 ' Moreover, it is not uncommon to find marked
variations as to the extent of the obligation even within one state. 39
There have been only a few reported federal tax cases dealing with the
question of the necessity of a college education. 4° In Mairs v. Reynolds
4'
the taxpayer created trusts for the maintenance and support of his children.
The income was used to pay for the children's tuition for the years 1934
and 1935. The Eighth Circuit held that such sums were to be considered
income to the grantor. 142 Although the taxpayer pointed out that Minnesota
law only required children to attend school between the ages of 8 and 11,
and that there was no further statutory obligation to provide a higher
education, the court found that "general law" and public policy required
more. 43 The Eighth Circuit stressed the argument that the taxpayer had
carefully chosen the schools in consideration of his own financial ability as
well as his children's position in life, and consequently, the money was
used to discharge a legal obligation. 44
Mairs indicates that if there is no specific statutory authority or case
law on the question of purchaser liability for an education trust, then the
135. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,986.
136. See Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1960). The amount of trust income which is included
in the gross income of a person obligated to support a dependent is limited by the extent of
his legal obligation under local law. Id.
137. See 3 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATEs, AND GIFTs 80.4.4
(1981).
138. See Nitzburg, The Obligation of Support: A Proposed Federal Standard, 23 TAX L.
REv. 93, 103 (1968).
139. Id.
140. See Mairs v. Reynolds, 120 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1941); Morrill v. United States, 228
F.Supp. 734 (D. Me. 1964); Braun v. Commissioner, 1984-285 T.C.M.
141. 120 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1941).
142. Mairs, 120 F.2d at 859-60 (8th Cir. 1941).
143. Id.; see also Nitzburg, supra note 138, at 108.
144. Mairs, 120 F.2d at 859-60; see also Nitzberg, supra note 138, at 108.
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so-called "general law" must be determined by examining the customs of
the citizenry. 145 This, of course, is quite likely to produce widely inconsistent
results.
One Tax Court decision directly addresses the taxability of an education
trust by determining whether a legal obligation exists according to state law.
In Braun v. Commissioner'46 the tax court held that, according to New
Jersey law, the income of two trusts expended for children's college tuition,
room and board was used to discharge legal support obligations and,
therefore, was taxable to the grantor under section 677(b). The court based
its reasoning on the case of Newburgh v. Arigo 47 in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that, while necessary education is a flexible concept
that varies with circumstances, in general, financially capable parents should
provide a college education for their children. Newburgh involved a contro-
versy between divorced parents, but the tax court in Braum held that the
support rule was not limited to the divorce context.
48
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies and variations within state law,
higher education has become increasingly perceived as "necessary." The
significant benefits of a college degree are obvious when examining em-
ployment prospects in virtually any field. Consequently, the obligation to
provide a college education, when financially feasible, has been enforced
up to the age of majority in a few states. 149 More movement in this direction
seems likely, as higher education has become a normal aspiration among
young people, and recent increases in tuition have made it increasingly
difficult for students to finance their own college education.
(2) Contractual Obligation
Finding that Parent is under a contractual obligation to pay for Child's
tuition may also provide a basis for taxing a Parent who purchases a tuition
prepayment contract. In Morrill v. United States 50 the court skirted the
issue of whether or not the taxpayer was under a legal support obligation
to provide a college education and held that the amount expended was
taxable income under a contract theory. The court held that the taxpayer
had expressly agreed to pay the tuition of two universities, and that the
145. See Mairs, 120 F.2d at 859; Nitzberg, supra note 138, at 109.
146. 1984-285 T.C.M.
147. 88 N.J. 529, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982).
148. Braum v. Commission, 1984-285 T.C.M. The court stated that the taxpayers clearly
retained an obligation to provide their children with a college education. They were willing
and able, and a college education was reasonable in light of the background, values, and goals
of the parents as well as the children. Id.
149. See Charlton v. Charlton, 397 Mich. 84, 243 N.W. 2d 261 (1976); Kaplan v.
Wallshein, 57 A.2d 828, 394 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (1977); H. KRAuSE, CHD SUPPoRT IN AmERiCA
33 (1981). There has not been much need to deal with education past majority, because college
is normally completed or nearly completed by the time a student reaches 21 years of age, and
graduate or professional training is rarely classified as necessary.
150. 228 F.Supp. 734 (D. Me. 1964).
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other colleges his children attended provided services in expectation that the
taxpayer would pay the costs. The court relied upon IRC section 677(a),
which provides that the grantor of a trust is taxable on the trust's income
when that income is used to satisfy the taxpayer's express or implied
contractual obligation. 
15
Although the Morrill court avoided deciding whether the parent in that
case was under a state-imposed support obligation to pay the costs of a
college education, the decision could pose a threat to tuition prepayment
plans. A court might find an express or implied contractual obligation on
the part of Parent to pay for Child's education. It would be difficult, if
not impossible, in most circumstances for Child, himself, to assume the
expenses paid by the plan. Consequently, a court might hold that Parent
initially assumed responsibility for the payments by express or implied
contract, and was relieved of that responsibility by the plan.Y
5 2
(3) Prepaid Funeral Plans
Another situation analogous to tuition prepayment plans involves pre-
paid funeral arrangements. The purchaser of a prepaid funeral plan contracts
with a funeral director for funeral merchandise and services. Payments made
by the purchaser are deposited into a trust and the principal, along with
any interest, is used to pay for the specified goods and services deliverable
upon the death of the purchaser. Under some plans the purchaser has the
right to cancel the plan and receive a refund. Under other plans, the
purchaser has the right to cancel the contract, but does not have a right to
a refund. In the latter case, the purchaser is limited to choosing another
funeral director.
Revenue ruling 87-127111 directly addresses the federal income tax treat-
ment of prepaid funeral plans. The ruling first holds that where the
purchaser is entitled to cancel the plan and receive a refund, the purchaser
is taxable on the income, because the plan is revocable under IRC section
676(a).5 4 This part of the ruling should not affect prepaid tuition plans,
such as MET's, under which the purchaser does not retain the right to
cancel the contract and thereby receive a refund.
151. Morrill v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 734 (D. Me. 1964); see also Treas. Reg. §
1.677(a)-l(d) (as amended in 1971), which provides in relevant part:
Under section 677 a grantor is, in general treated as the owner ... of a trust whose
income is, or in the discretion of the grantor ... may be applied in discharge of a
legal obligation of the grantor.
Id.
152. See Nitzburg, supra note 138, at 110.
153. Rev. Rul. 87-127, 1987-2 C.B. 156.
154. Id. at 158. I.R.C. § 676(a) provides in relevant part:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust ... where at
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However, the ruling went on to hold that the purchaser is taxable on
the income, even under those plans that do not give the purchaser the right
to cancel the contract and receive a refund. 155 The Service based this holding
on IRC section 677(a). The ruling held that in those states in which the
purchaser's spouse has a legal obligation to pay for a funeral, the income
earned on the money deposited into the trust may be applied to discharge
an obligation of the grantor or the grantor's spouse within the ambit of
IRC section 677(a). 51 Therefore, under IRC section 677(a), the purchaser
is treated as the owner of the entire trust and the income of the trust is
includible in the purchaser's gross income in the year in which the income
is earned by the trust.
5 7
A tuition prepayment plan could fall under section 677(a) by analogy
to prepaid funeral arrangements. However, this will occur only if Parent,
by state law or by implied contract, is under some legal obligation to pay
Child's tuition. This remains a matter of local law.' 8
(4) Reversionary Interest
IRC section 673 provides that a trust grantor is taxable on income from
any portion of a trust in which he has a reversionary interest in either the
corpus or income if, as of the inception of that portion, the value of such
interest exceeds five percent of the value of such portion. 59 The purchaser
of a prepaid tuition contract would retain a reversionary interest if he
designates himself as the recipient of any refund under the contract.'6
However, in the case of the MET contract, the value of the reversionary
interest is very difficult to compute because the reversion can be triggered
only by an unpredictable occurrence, such as the beneficiary's death, his
failure to be admitted to college or his own decision not to attend college
even if accepted. 16' The mechanical method of using actuarial tables to
compute the value of the reversionary interest is inadequate to deal with
such unpredictable occurrences.
155. Rev. Rul. 87-127 at 158, 1987-2 C.B. 156.
156. Id.
157. Id. The ruling also held that the grantor is taxable under I.R.C. § 673(a) (retention
by grantor of reversionary interest) if the grantor's estate has an obligation under state law
to pay for the funeral expenses. It is not likely that IRC § 673(a) will apply to require an
income inclusion by the purchaser of a prepaid tuition plan. See infra text accompanying notes
159-64.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 132-52.
159. I.R.C. § 673(a) provides in relevant part:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in which he has
a reversionary interest ... if, as of the inception of that portion .... the value of
such interest exceeds 5 percent of the value of such portion.
I.R.C. § 673(a).
160. See Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract § 7, which permits Parent
to retain the right to a refund under certain limited contingencies.
161. Id. §§ 6, 7. See also B. BrrTrR & M. McMAI~o, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION OF
INDivrDUALs 35-12 (1988).
PREPAID COLLEGE TUITION PLANS
Private Letter Ruling 89-01-027, in dealing with application of the gift
tax to a prepaid tuition contract, provides guidance on valuation of a
reversionary interest retained by Parent under the contract. 62 The Service
stated that if the prepaid tuition contract designates the purchaser as
recipient of any refund, the reversionary interest is contingent and incapable
of valuation.' 63 Consequently, the value of the gift at the time of the
contract purchase is the entire amount paid by the purchaser for the contract
and is not reduced on account of the reversionary interest. 164 This line of
reasoning suggests that the purchaser of a prepaid tuition contract is not
liable for income tax under IRC section 673 on account of the reversionary
interest represented by the refund right. The value of such a reversionary
interest is incalculable and should be disregarded. Therefore, the requirement
that the value of the reversionary interest exceed five percent of the value
of the property in which the reversion is retained is not met. Hence, the
purchaser should not be taxed under IRC section 673(a).
2. Gift Tax Treatment of Parent
When Parent purchases the MET contract it appears that under the
federal gift tax Parent has made an indirect transfer to Child. 65 Letter
Ruling 88-25-027 properly found that such a purchase was an indirect
transfer to Child.'6 Nevertheless, there remains a question as to whether
162. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-01-027 (Jan. 6, 1989).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(3) (as amended in 1986). § 25.7511-1(h)(3) provides:
The payment of money or the transfer of property to B in consideration of B's
promise to render a service to C is a gift to C, or to both B and C, depending on
whether the service to be rendered to C is or is not an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth for that which is received by B.
Id.
166. Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,988. The Service refined its position in Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 89-01-027 (Jan. 6, 1989). Under the facts of Priv. Let. Rul. 89-01-027, for a Parent who
is making a series of installment payments to the prepaid tuition plan, default would terminate
the contract and entitle Parent to a refund of amounts previously paid (but not to any income
earned on those amounts). Id. The Service concluded that in such a case, the transfer is not
complete for gift tax purposes until Parent makes all the payments due. Id. The Service
reached this conclusion on the ground that Parent, at any time up to the final payment, could
opt to receive back all prior payments by simply defaulting on the payments. Id. The Service
did not explore the income tax consequences of the installment plan. Id. It might be argued
that the potential to receive a refund of the purchase price by defaulting on the installments
would constitute a power to revoke the gift under the income tax. If so, the income on the
refundable amounts might be taxable to Parent as it is earned under I.R.C. §676(a), or even
on assignment of income principles. See infra text accompanying notes 153-58; Rev. Rul. 87-
127, 1987-2 C.B. 156, 158 (situation 4). MET's installment plan is not susceptible to this
argument, since it does not provide for refund on default. See Michigan Education Trust Full
Benefits Plan Contract § 5.
An argument might also be made that only a part of the purchase price is subject to gift
tax where Parent retains a right to a refund if the contract terminates, and, hence retains a
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the transfer should be subject to gift tax. Two possible exclusion provisions
might apply.
First, the transfer might come within the $10,000 annual gift tax
exclusion. This exclusion applies only to gifts of present interests in prop-
erty. 167 An interest is a present interest only if the beneficiary is entitled to
an unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of the
property. 161 In the case of the MET contract, Child generally is not entitled
to the educational benefits under the contract or to a refund under the
contract until he reaches college age. 169 Therefore, apparently the IRS
correctly concluded in Letter Ruling 88-25-027 that Parent is not entitled
to the $10,000 annual exclusion.
70
The second possible exclusion provision is more problematic. IRC
section 2503(e)(2) affords an exclusion for "any amount paid on behalf of
an individual ... as tuition to an educational organization described in
section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education or training of such individ-
ual ... .,,v' There is no doubt the MET contract price paid by Parent
qualifies as an "amount paid on behalf of an individual .. . as tuition."
The question is whether the payment is "to an educational organization
described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii)."
Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) is applicable to:
an educational organization which normally maintains a regular
faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled body
of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational
activities are regularly carried on.' 72
Clearly, MET does not fall within this description. The only argument that
can be made is that somehow MET is acting on behalf of a qualified
organization when it takes payment of the contract price. For example, one
might argue that MET is acting as an agent for state higher education
institutions when it takes payment of the contract price. Certainly, the
spirit, if not the letter, of the section 2503(e) exclusion encompasses MET
reversionary interest in the amount paid. The Service concluded that retention of such a
reversionary interest does not prevent gift taxation of the full purchase price, because the
events entitling Parent to a refund under the terms of the contract are so contingent and
speculative (at least where a lump sum payment is made) as to make Parent's reversionary
interest incapable of valuation. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
167. See I.R.C. § 2503(b), which provides in relevant part:
In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property) made to any
person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $10,000 of such gifts to such
person shall not... be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year.
I.R.C. § 2503(b).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (as amended in 1983).
169. See MicH. LAws § 390.1428; Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract
§ 7. A refund may also be payable if a child dies or becomes disabled. Id.
170. Ltr. Rul. supra note 52 at 54,988.
171. I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2).
172. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).
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contract payments. Congress clearly intended to exclude from gift tax
amounts paid on behalf of an individual for tuition. Undoubtedly, the
typical situation Congress envisioned was payment of a child's tuition by a
parent or grandparent. There is no good reason why the policy behind the
exclusion should be so limited as to treat payment of tuition through an
intermediary worse than direct payment to an institution. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to fit the MET transaction into the literal wording of the statute.
Consequently, it seems that IRS was at least technically correct in imposing
gift tax liability on Parent when Parent purchases a MET contract.
3. Income Tax Treatment of MET
The most surprising aspect of Letter Ruling 88-25-027 was its holding
that MET itself is liable for income tax on its investment income. Prior to
the ruling there was respectable opinion among those familiar with prepaid
tuition plans that MET would be exempt from tax as either: 1) an integral
part of state government; or 2) an entity performing an essential govern-
mental function whose income accrues to the state. 73 Moreover, if MET is
not tax-exempt for either of the foregoing two reasons, it may be tax-
exempt under IRC section 501(c)(3) as an educational organization. 74 Fi-
nally, even if MET is not tax-exempt, a question remains as to the appro-
priate application of the income tax to an entity such as MET.
a. Integral Part of State Government
The Internal Revenue Service has long taken the position that an integral
part of state government is not subject to income tax. For example, in
Revenue Rulings 71-131 and 71-132, the Service held that the profits from
state-owned liquor stores are not subject to the income tax, because the
stores are operated as an integral part of the state.7 5 These rulings super-
seded and adopted the reasoning of G.C.M. 14407, which likewise exempted
state-owned liquor stores from income tax.176 The Service pointed out that
it never has attempted to tax the direct income of a state. The Service said:
Not only has the Bureau failed to tax the direct income of any
state or municipality but it has throughout this period of 22 years
made no effort to obtain income returns from states or municipal-
ities, or to determine by any other means whether any State or
municipality has had income of this nature. This persistent non-
enforcement of the tax against States may be reasonably explained
173. See Statement of Professor Leo J. Raskind, University of Minnesota Law School,
in INvTrrATiONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 41; Statement of Lawrence D. Owen, Partner,
Miller, Canfield, Paddock, and Stone, id. at 42.
174. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
175. See Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 29; Rev. Rul. 71-132, 1971-1 C.B. 29.
176. Gen. Couns. Mem. 14407, XIV-1 C.B. 103 (1935), superseded by Rev. Ru!. 71-131,
1971-1 C.B. 29; Rev. Rul. 71-132, 1971-1 C.B. 29.
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only as indicating a tacit construction by the Bureau in accordance
with the interpretation that has just been suggested.'"
The IRS bases its position on the notion that a state or subdivision of a
state is not taxable in the absence of a specific statutory provision imposing
tax. Because the income tax statute imposes a tax generally on individuals,
estates, trusts, and corporations, but not on states, it follows that states
generally are not subject to income tax. 7
8
There is a plausible argument that MET is not subject to income tax,
because it is an integral part of the state. MET is created by statute as a
"body corporate and politic" within the State Department of Treasury. 79
Its funds can be pooled with other state funds for investment purposes.8 0
The statute mandates the priority in which MET may expend its funds, 8
and MET must make an annual accounting to the governor, the Majority
and Minority Leaders of the State Senate, and the Majority and Minority
Leaders of the State House of Representatives.8 2 The statute dictates the
membership on the Board of Directors that governs MET and state officials
comprise most of the Board's membership. 83 The statute also mandates
both the substance and form of MET contracts,'8 and authorizes MET to
177. Id. at 105.5
178. See Rev. Rul. 87-2, 1987-1 C.B. 18 (Lawyer Trust Account fund created and
controlled by State Supreme Court not subject to income tax because integral part of state
government). The Service position is based on the income tax statute itself, and not on any
constitutional limitation on the power of the federal government to tax the states under the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.
The precise constitutional limits on the power of the federal government to tax the state
remain unclear. See Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Consti-
tutional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073, 1080-85 (1980); Tucker & Rombro, State Immunity from
Federal Taxation: The Need for Reexamination, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 501, 503-512 (1975).
In New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946), which upheld a federal excise tax
on mineral water bottled by the state of New York, Justice Frankfurter, announcing the
judgment without plurality, stated that the constitutional test should be whether "Congress
generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being
earned by a state .... Chief Justice Stone in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Reed,
Murphy, and Burton, stated:
Only when and because the subject of taxation is State property or a State activity
must we consider whether such a non-discriminatory tax unduly interferes with the
performance of the State's functions of government. If it does, then the fact that
the tax is non-discriminatory does not save it.
Id. at 588.
From this, it appears that Congress constitutionally can impose the income tax on at least
some state income. Moreover, it has imposed an income tax on the unrelated business income
of state universities. See I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(B). Even so, it might be argued, under the Stone
formulation, that a tax on MET unduly interferes with the state's function of providing higher
education to its citizenry. See infra text accompanying notes 195-209.
179. MICH. LAWS § 390.1425.
180. Id. § 390.1429(4).
181. Id. § 390.1429(3).
182. Id. § 390.1432.
183. Id. § 390.1430(1). See also supra note 37.
184. MICH. LAWS § 390.1426(1); § 390.1427.
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contract on behalf of itself and the state.'8 5 Finally, the statute subjects
MET to the state Open Meeting Law and to the state Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.'
86
All of the foregoing indicates a legislative intent that MET be an integral
part of the state. Nevertheless, the legislature also intended that MET would
not depend on the state for funding. Accordingly, the statute contemplates
that MET will be self-supporting.'8 7 This conforms with the purpose of the
legislation to further higher education. Purchasers of MET contracts want
to be assured of the financial soundness of the fund and that MET's
performance of its obligations not be subject to the vagaries of the state
appropriations process.
In keeping with the financial soundness concept the statute further
provides that:
Assets of [MET] shall not be considered state money, common
cash of the state, revenue for the purposes of sections 26 to 34 of
article IX of the state constitution of 1963, nor state money for
purposes of Act No. 259 of the Public Acts of 1982 .... 181
The state constitutional provisions to which the statute refers concern
limitations on state taxes and expenditures. 8 9 The obvious purpose of the
statute is to exclude MET from these limitations because MET is self-
financing. The statute also exempts MET from the operation of Act No.
259 of the Public Acts of 1982 for a similar reason. Act No. 259 makes
all "state money" subject to the claims of holders of general state obliga-
tions. 19° Again, the self-financing character of MET makes application of
this law to MET inappropriate. One of the primary goals of MET is to
assure purchasers of MET contracts that MET can and will fulfill its
obligations to provide educational services. That is the reason the legislature
designed MET to be self-financing. Both of the foregoing exemptions from
general state financial management laws are basically additional means to
assure that MET can and will meet its obligations to contract purchasers.
Nevertheless, the Service found that MET is not an integral part of
state government. The Service stressed the statutory phraseology that MET
funds are "not state money" or "common cash" of the state. 19' Perhaps
the Service misconstrued the limited function of this phraseology, which
185. See id. § 390.1426(1)(h); § 390.1431(k).
186. Id. § 390.1430(5),(6).
187. See id. § 390.1429; § 390.1433. The statute provides specifically:
[MET] shall be administered in a manner reasonably designed to be actuarially sound
such that the assets of [MET] will be sufficient to defray the obligations of the
trust.
Id. § 390.1433(1).
188. Id. § 390.1429(2).
189. See MicH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 26-34.
190. See MicH. LAws § 12.61-64.
191. See Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987.
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was to exempt MET from certain provisions of state fiscal management
law. At the least, it is dubious whether this exemption should cause MET
to be precluded from treatment as an integral part of state government.
The Service also cited in support of its conclusion the point that MET
funds are exempt from claims of general state creditors. 92 However, this
exemption is an essential feature of the state's strategy in creating MET
because it furthers the primary function of assuring purchasers of MET
contracts that the educational services promised in fact will be provided.
It is certainly plausible to assert that MET is an integral part of state
government given MET's creation by the state, its intimate relationships
with the state, and its furtherance of the vital state function of higher
education. The Service's conclusion that MET is not an integral part of
state government is ironic in view of prior IRS holdings that legislative
creatures, such as state liquor stores, are integral parts of state govern-
ment. 93 Under the IRS position it appears that to achieve status as an
integral part of state government, a state-sponsored tuition prepayment plan
would, at the least, have to make plan funds subject to the general claims
of state creditors and provide that plan funds are part of general state
funds. 9 4 Of course, to the extent that plan funds are put at risk by such
provisions, the state's goal of guaranteeing contract purchasers that the
educational services promised actually will be provided is pro tanto curtailed.
b. IRC Section 115
IRC section 115 excludes from gross income, "income derived from
any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and
accruing to a State. . . ."-1 Section 115 applies when the potentially taxable
entity is not an integral part of state government. 96 Hence, even if MET
192. Id.
193. See Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 29; Rev. Rul. 71-132, 1971-1 C.B. 29.
194. The Florida statute attempts to make the Florida prepaid education fund an integral
part of state government by providing that:
There is created within the State Treasury the Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Trust Fund.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.551(4) (West 1989). The Florida statute further provides that:
The Florida Postsecondary Education Expense Program shall be administered by the
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board as an agency of the state.
Id. § 240.551(5).
However, Florida may not have accomplished its objective because its statute also contains
provisions that appear to shield the fund from the claims of state creditors. See id. §
240.551(4),(10). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.551(10) provides in relevant part:
The assets of the fund shall be maintained, invested, and expended solely for the
purposes of this section and shall not be loaned, transferred, or otherwise used by
the state for any purpose other than the purposes of this section.
Id. § 240.551(10).
195. I.R.C. § 115(1). This section dates as far back as the income tax originally enacted
in 1913. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § I1 G(a)[3], 38 Stat. 166 (1913).
196. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 14,407 (1935), XIV-1 C.B. 103; Rev. Rul. 77-261, 1977-2
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is not an integral part of state government, it may still come within this
exclusion from gross income. To qualify for exclusion under IRC section
115 MET must establish that: 1) its income is derived from the exercise of
an essential governmental function; and 2) its income accrues to the state.
197
(1) Essential Governmental Function
Consequently, the first question is whether MET's income derives from
the exercise of an essential governmental function. Neither the Code nor
the regulations specifically defines the term "essential governmental func-
tion." Moreover, there has been little judicial interpretation of the term. 98
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that provision and facilitation of
education, including higher education, to its citizens long has been one of
the essential functions of state government.99
The State of Michigan recognizes this essential function by including
an article pertaining to education in its Constitution. 20° The first section of
that article provides that: "[r]eligion, morality and knowledge being nec-
essary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall be forever encouraged.' '201 Furthermore, the Mi-
chigan Constitution explicitly provides for creation and maintenance by the
state of higher education institutions. 202 Finally, the MET enabling statute
acknowledges the essential state function of higher education in its preamble
by expressly stating:
(b) It is a responsibility of state government to maintain state
institutions of higher education as provided by section 4 of article
VIII of the state constitution of 1963.
C.B. 45. If the entity is an integral part of state government section 115 is inapplicable. In
that case the Service agrees that, in the absence of a specific provision imposing tax (such as
I.R.C. section 511(a)(2)(B) imposing unrelated business income tax on state colleges and
universities), the income tax statute simply does not reach the entity. See supra text accom-
panying notes 175-78.
197. See I.R.C. § 115(1); Tucker & Rombro, supra note 178, at 525.
198. See Tucker & Rombro, supra note 178, at 527-46.
199, See Page v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 93 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir. 1937), rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom. Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 339 (1938). In Page the court stated:
The preamble in the ancient act, Watkins' Digest, p. 299, is an unanswerable
argument for higher education as a function of democratic government. It reads in
part: 'As it is the distinguishing happiness of free government that civil order should
be the result of choice and not necessity, and the common wishes of the people
becomes the law of the land, their public prosperity and even existence very much
depends upon suitably forming the minds and morals of their citizens * * * This is
an influence beyond the sketch of laws and punishments, and can be claimed only
by religion and education.'
Id.
200. See MicH. CONST. art. VIII (1963).
201. Id. art. VIII, § I (emphasis added).
202. Id. art. VIII, §§ 4-7.
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(c) It is an essential function of state government to encourage
attendance at state institutions of higher education.
20 3
Given all the above, it is indisputable that the Michigan legislature, at least,
regards MET as performing an essential governmental function by facilitat-
ing and encouraging state citizens to obtain the benefits of higher education.
The Service ruled that MET's income is not derived from exercise of
an essential governmental function, because in the Service's view, MET
primarily serves private interests that are not incidental to a public interest.
2 °4
As support for this view IRS stated:
[MET] provides [Child] with a direct economic benefit in the form
of education the value of which is expected to be substantially in
excess of the up-front payment. Moreover, this benefit is available
only to those persons such as [Child] who are beneficiaries of a
contract.2 5
Assuming the foregoing to be true, that is not sufficient reason to deny
application of section 115.
The very nature of education requires that the primary beneficiaries be
the recipients of the education. It is impossible to accomplish the essential
state function of education without directly benefiting those educated. It is
necessary for private citizens to benefit directly from their individual edu-
cations in order to achieve the public good flowing from an educated
populace. For example, state financial support permits public institutions
of higher education to charge tuition below the actual cost of providing
education. The state, thereby, confers a direct benefit on students attending
those institutions in the form of a subsidized tuition rate. 201 But few would
argue that this means the state is not carrying on an essential governmental
function. By the same token, the fact that some individuals benefit directly
from MET should not, of itself, disqualify MET from the status of
performing an essential governmental function for purposes of section 115.207
203. MIcH. LAWS § 390.1422(b),(c).
204. See Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987. The Service interpreted the "essential
governmental function" requirement as follows:
To qualify under section 115, it must be established that the income does not serve
private interests such as designated individuals, shareholders of organizations, or
persons controlled directly or indirectly, by such private interests. Thus, even if the
income serves a public interest, the requirements of section 115 are not satisfied if
the income also serves a private interest that is not incidental to the public interest.
The basic principle of section 115 is that property (including any income thereon)
must be devoted to purposes which are considered beneficial to the community in
general, rather than particular individuals.
Id.
205. Id.
206. See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HAxv. L. Ray. 925, 935-37 (1967).
207. There are other instances of the same principle. For example, should a public marina
be taxable because the boat owners who rent dock space benefit from its operation? What
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Although MET does not dispense education directly, it does provide a means
by which higher education is made more readily available to the public.
Finally, the apparent purpose of section 115 is to avoid the overbur-
dening of state government by federal taxation. 2 8 The IRS position imposing
tax liability on MET has precisely such an overburdening effect.2°9
(2) Income Accruing to State
The Service did not reach the second requirement for application of
section 115, that the income accrue to the state. However, fulfillment of
the second requirement is closely connected with satisfaction of the first.
By holding that MET is not an integral part of state government, and that
MET's income is not derived from performance of an essential governmental
function, IRS implicitly found that MET's income does not accrue to the
state. If either of these holdings were reversed, it seems to follow that
MET's income would accrue to the state by reason of the fact that the
income is being used for state purposes, and thereby the second requirement
of section 115 would be satisfied.
c. Section 501(c)(3) Status
If MET is not exempt from income tax by reason of being an integral
part of state government or by operation of IRC section 115, it still might
qualify for tax-exempt status as a section 501(c)(3) organization. MET can
argue that it comes within the section 501(c)(3) language by being "organized
and operated exclusively for ... charitable ... or educational purposes.
'210
about a public airport that rents hangar space to plane owners? A public park that rents
campsites to campers? Moreover, the fact that MET is designed to be financially independent
should not disqualify it from exclusion under § 115. Two cases, Maryland Savings-Share Ins.
Corp. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 400 U.S. 4
(1970), and Jamestown & Newport Ferry Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 638 (1929), have
intimated that state financing is a requirement for qualification under the essential governmental
function test. However, such a requirement would essentially negate the test, because it would
permit a state to satisfy the test or not by the expedient of either providing or not providing
some state financing. See Tucker & Rombro, supra note 178, at 536.
208. See Maryland Savings, 308 F. Supp. 761; Tucker & Rombro, supra note 178, at 536-
37.
209. See infra text accompanying notes 247-57.
210. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides in relevant part for tax exempt status of the following
kinds of organization:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary,
or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities
of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation,
... and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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Its argument would be that it is organized and operated for the exempt
purpose of promoting higher education.
MET applied for section 501(c)(3) status following issuance of Letter
Ruling 88-25-027.2 1 The Service denied MET 501(c)(3) status in April 1989,
on the ground that MET serves a private rather than public interest.212 The
similarity of this determination to the IRS position on application of IRC
section 115 in Letter Ruling 88-25-027 is obvious. Essentially, the Service
has taken the position that the benefits received by participants in the MET
program preclude MET from tax exempt status under either IRC section
115 or section 501(c)(3).
It is undeniable that MET serves an educational purpose by providing
a mechanism to facilitate and encourage parents (or others) to pay for their
children's college education. The question is whether the private benefits
MET provides its participants are so substantial in relation to the public
benefits derived from MET as to prevent section 501(c)(3) status. The
arguments in favor of a negative answer to this question are much the same
as the arguments for tax exemption under IRC section 115 .213
The primary argument is that educational purposes, by their very nature,
cannot be accomplished without conferring a private benefit on the persons
being educated. 21 4 Hence, the fact that private individuals benefit under
MET should not preclude section 501(c)(3) status.
An analogous issue was raised in Sound Health Association v. Com-
missioner.215 That case involved the application of a health maintenance
organization (HMO) for exempt status. An HMO provides health services
to its members in return for a flat fee. This resembles the MET arrangement.
In both cases the organization offers services to participants in its program
in exchange for payment of a fee. Both organizations have an exempt
purpose, advancement of health for the HMO and advancement of education
for MET.
The Service denied exempt status to the HMO, stating:
Although you will provide some health services to the general
public, it is clear that preferential treatment will be accorded your
member-subscribers. This characteristic is incompatible with the
requirement of section 1.501.(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) of the Income Tax
Regulations that an organization must serve a public rather than a
private interest in order to qualify under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code.
216
211. Telephone interview with Lawrence D. Owen, Esq., Partner in Miller, Canfield,
Paddock, and Stone (July 13, 1989) [hereinafter Owen interview]. Mr. Owen and his firm
were principal drafters of the MET legislation.
212. Id,
213. See supra text accompanying notes 195-209.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 206-07.
215. 71 T.C. 158 (1978).
216. Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner; 71 T.C. 158, 176 (1978).
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The Tax Court rejected the Service's contentions and ruled that the HMO
was a charitable organization entitled to section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
The fact that the HMO charged fees to its members did not preclude tax-
exempt status. 2 7 The court declared that, "It]he term 'charitable' is thus
capable of a definition far broader than merely the relief of the poor. '218
The court also found that the HMO satisfied both the organizational
and operational tests for exempt status. The key factors were that the HMO
made its services available for treatment of the indigent and that its
membership was open to the entire community. 219 The court said:
The most important feature of the Association's membership form
of organization is that the class of person's eligible for membership,
and hence eligible to benefit from the Association's activities, is
practically unlimited. The class of possible members of the Asso-
ciation is for all practical purposes, the class of members of the
community itself.220
The court also pointed out that the basic criteria for determining whether
an organization qualifies for exemption have been derived from the law of
charitable trusts.'" In this regard, the court declared that an organization
will qualify for exempt status "if the class served is not so small that its
relief is not of benefit to the community.'"' The court quoted a leading
treatise, Scott on Trusts, to the effect that:
A trust is not a charitable trust if the persons who are to benefit
are not of a sufficiently large or indefinite class so that the com-
munity is interested in the enforcement of the trust. 223
The negative implication is that an organization should qualify if the class
served is sufficiently large.
Finally, the court asserted that, in order for an organization to be
operated for exempt purposes (the operational test),
the purposes toward which an organization's activities are directed,
and not the nature of the activities themselves, is ultimately dis-
positive of the organization's right to be classified as a section
501(c)(3) organization under section 501(a). * * * Rather, the critical
inquiry is whether petitioner's primary purpose for engaging in its
sole activity is an exempt purpose, or whether its primary purpose
217. Id. at 178-80.
218. Id. at 178 (quoting Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278,
1287, vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1975)).
219. Id. at 178-86.
220. Id. at 185.
221. Id. at 177.
222. Id. at 181.
223. Id. (quoting 4 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 372.2 at 2897 (3d ed. 1967)).
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is the nonexempt one of operating a commercial business producing
net profits for petitioner.2
24
Hence, to determine exempt status one must look to the ultimate purpose
of the organization.
The principles articulated in Sound Health indicate that MET should
be entitled to tax exempt status. Eligibility for participation in the MET
program is wide open. Virtually anyone can purchase a contract and a
beneficiary need only be a resident of the state?25 MET has enhanced the
availability of its benefits by arranging with financial institutions for pur-
chasers to acquire MET contracts on the installment plan.226 Thus, MET
meets the open membership standard enunciated in Sound Health. In
addition, MET plans to provide scholarships to needy students who cannot
afford MET contracts, thereby meeting the second Sound Health standard
of making services available to the indigent. 227 This appears to meet the
condition, set out in Scott on Trusts, that the class benefited be sufficiently
large to make the community interested in enforcement of the exempt
purpose.?
Finally, although MET does not engage directly in educational activity,
its fundamental purposes all involve the advancement of education.229 This
complies with the operational test that the purpose of an organization's
activities, not the nature of the activities themselves, determines the organ-
ization's entitlement to tax exempt status.20 Therefore, based on the fore-
going, MET seems entitled to section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
224. Id. at 190 (quoting B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57
(1978)).
225. See MICH. LAWS §§ 390.1424(e), 390.1426(1). The purchaser of a MET contract must
be over 18 years of age or a designated custodian under the Michigan Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act. Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract § 17(aa).
226. See Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract § 5.
227. MET Letter of Protest to IRS Determination Letter 3 (May 25, 1989).
228. See supra note 223.
229. See MicH. LAws § 390.1423, which states MET's purposes to be as follows:
(a) To encourage education and the means of education.
(b) To maintain state institutions of higher education by helping to provide a stable
financial base to these institutions.
(c) To provide wide and affordable access to state institutions of higher education
for the residents of [Michigan].
(d) To encourage attendance at state institutions of higher education.
(e) To provide students and their parents economic protection against rising tuition
costs.
(f) To provide students and their parents financing assistance for postsecondary
education at a Michigan institution of higher education of their choice.
(g) To help provide the benefits of higher education to the people of [Michigan].
(h) To encourage elementary and secondary students in [Michigan] to achieve high
standards of performance.
Id.
230. See supra text accompanying note 224.
PREPAID COLLEGE TUITION PLANS
d. MET as a Taxable Entity
Although there are good reasons why MET should be accorded exempt
treatment under the income tax, the question remains as to the proper tax
treatment of MET if IRS ultimately prevails in its contention that MET is
a taxable entity. The Service did not address this issue in Letter Ruling 88-
25-027. The Service simply said that MET was taxable on its investment
income, but did not elaborate.2'
This article takes the position that MET should be tax-exempt, because
either: 1) it is an integral part of state government; 2) it derives its income
from an essential governmental activity under IRC section 115; or 3) it
qualifies for tax-exempt status under IRC section 501(c)(3). Hence, a detailed
discussion of the myriad issues that arise if MET is a taxable entity are
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to summarize
these issues here because their resolution bears on the practical consequences
to prepaid tuition plans should the IRS position ultimately prevail.
The fundamental question concerns the appropriate tax classification of
MET. Should it be considered a simple trust, a complex trust, or a
corporation for tax purposes? The ultimate tax effects to MET will, of
course, differ depending on its tax classification.2 2 For example, if MET is
classified as a trust, the net tax liability to MET might be zero because a
simple trust can take a deduction for income to which the trust beneficiaries
have a current right.233 However, it is doubtful that MET qualifies as a
simple trust. Not only is MET's income not required to be distributed
currently, but rather its income may not be distributed until certain events
occur, such as Child attending a state college.2
4
A complex trust is any trust other than a simple trust. Thus, a complex
trust can accumulate its income for future distribution.25 If MET is a
complex trust it would pay tax at a marginal rate of twenty-eight percent
of taxable income during the time it accumulates income. When educational
services are provided, Child would pay tax on the accumulated income
231. See Ltr. Rul., supra note 52, at 54,987-88. Neither did the Service address the issue
in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-01-027 (Jan. 6, 1989), the only other letter ruling so far published with
respect to tuition prepayment plans.
232. See Tax Implications of Michigan Tuition Prepayment Program Remain Unsettled,
39 TAx Norms 676 (1988) [hereinafter Tax Implications].
233. See Tax Implications, supra note 232, at 677; I.R.C. § 651(a), which provides in
relevant part:
a) DEDUCTION.- In the case of any trust the terms of which-
(1) provide that all of its income is required to be distributed currently, and
(2) do not provide that any amounts are to be paid, permanently set aside, or used
for the purposes specified in section 642(c) (relating to deduction for charitable, etc.,
purposes), there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable income
of the trust the amount of the income which is required to be distributed currently.
Id. § 651(a).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
235. See I.R.C. §§ 661-64; 3 B. BrTrER, FEDnEAL TAxATiON OF INcoME, Gnwrs, ND
ESTATES 81.4 (1981).
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minus any tax paid by MET under the intricate "throwback rules. ' '12 6
Despite its name (Michigan Education Trust), MET may not be a trust
for income tax purposes. Treasury regulation section 301.7701-4(c)(1) pro-
vides that an investment trust will be taxed as a corporation "if there is a
power under the trust agreement to vary the investments of the certificate
holders." 237 In Revenue Ruling 77-261 IRS held that an investment fund
similar to MET was an investment trust. 2 8 MET has the authority to vary
its investments. 2 9 The Service, by characterizing purchasers of MET con-
tracts as "certificate holders," might contend that this authority satisfies
the regulation.
If IRS were successful in this contention, MET would be classified as
a corporation for federal tax purposes. However, that characterization only
raises more questions. For example, if MET is a corporation, who are the
shareholders? Are they the contract purchasers? The beneficiaries? The state
of Michigan? Or is MET a corporation without any shareholders? Moreover,
what kind of a corporation would MET be?
On the last question, MET can make a plausible argument that it should
be classified as an insurance company. The Code defines a life insurance
company as a "company which is engaged in the business of issuing life
insurance and annuity contracts... ." if more than half of its business
during the taxable year is the issuing of such contracts.3 In Letter Ruling
88-25-027 the Service basically treated Parent and Child in the same way
as if Parent had bought an annuity contract with Child as beneficiary.24,
Consequently, it would be consistent to treat MET as a seller of annuity
contracts and, accordingly, a life insurance company under the Code's
definition because more than half of MET's business would be the issuance
of annuity contracts. 2
If MET is treated as a life insurance company, it should be allowed to
take a deduction for additions to reserves in anticipation of future payouts
on its contracts. Although income tax law normally denies deductions on
account of reserves for anticipated expenses,23 the Code explicitly permits
236. See I.R.C. §§ 665-68; 3 B. BIrTKER, supra note 235, at 81-5 to 81-53; Tax
Implications, supra note 232, at 677.
237. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (1986).
238. Rev. Rul. 77-261, 1977-2 C.B. 45. An investment trust enables a number of investors
to acquire an interest in an array of securities. This permits them to participate in a relatively
widespread investment thereby diversifying their own investment. See Commissioner v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 122 F.2d 540, 541 (2d Cir. 1941); Rev. Rul. 75-192, 1975-1 C.B. 384; B. BITTKER
& J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 2.03 (5th ed. 1987).
239. See MICH. LAWS § 390.1429(4).
240. I.R.C. § 816(a) (emphasis added).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 123-29.
242. In this connection it is noteworthy that IRS itself raised the possibility of MET being
classified as a life insurance company in its determination letter denying MET section 501(c)(3)
status. Determination Letter to Michigan Education Trust from Chief, IRS Exempt Organi-
zations Rulings Branch 1, p.9 (April 26, 1989).
243. See I.R.C. § 461(h) (deduction not normally allowable until economic performance
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such a deduction in the case of life insurance companies.2" In this case,
MET's deductions might well fully offset its gross income, which would
leave it with no taxable income because MET is established to break even
actuarially. MET is designed to pay out over time, in the form of educational
benefits, as much as it takes in after administrative expenses.4 5 Hence, its
deductions on account of additions to reserves for anticipated payouts
should equal its investment income over time. Such treatment would make
sense from an accounting standpoint because, as previously stated, MET is
designed to break even, not make a profit.
III. POLICY CONSmERATIONS
The preceding discussion demonstrates that, at best, existing law is
murky with respect to the income tax treatment of prepaid tuition contracts.
This is not surprising because prepaid tuition contracts are a relatively new
idea.246 The law has not yet caught up with the concept. For purposes 6f
the IRC, therefore, prepaid tuition plans appear to be sui generis. Conse-
quently, current law is inadequate, and legislation specifically pertaining to
federal taxation of prepaid tuition plans is needed.
A. Practical Effects of Existing Law
There are two adverse effects on prepaid tuition plans under existing
law. First, if the IRS position enunciated in Letter Rulings 88-25-027 and
89-01-027 is upheld, the adverse tax consequences of that position will make
the economic viability of prepaid tuition plans much more difficult to
sustain. Second, the uncertainty surrounding existing law acts as a deterrent
to further implementation of prepaid tuition plans.
1. Adverse Tax Consequences
The IRS position is that Parent is subject to gift tax on purchase of a
MET contract, MET is subject to tax on its investment income during the
occurs); Treas. Reg. 1.461-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1967) (no deduction allowable for accrual
method taxpayer until "all events have occurred which determine the fact of the liability and
the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."); Brown v. Helvering, 291
U.S. 193 (1934) (deduction denied insurance agent for addition to reserve in anticipation of
policy cancellations); Sebring v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 20 (1989) (payments of cash to fund
characterized as reserve for future liabilities not currently deductible); Simplified Tax Records,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 75 (1963) (addition to reserve for estimated future cost of
preparing clients' tax returns not deductible); Rev. Rul. 76-345, 1972-2 C.B. 134; B. BrrTER,
FEDERAL TAXATIoN OF INCoME ESTATES AND GiFTs 105.3.6 (1981).
244. See I.R.C. §§ 805(a)(2), 807(b),(c); Joint Comm. on Taxation, Staff Overview of
Federal Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Companies and 1988 Interim Treasury Department
Report, Scheduled for a Hearing Before the House Ways and Means Select Revenue Measures
Subcommittee (JCS-16-18) 5-7 (100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1988) reprinted in BNA Daily Tax
Report No. 187 at L-8 to L-9 (Sept. 27, 1988).
245. See MicH. LAws § 390.1433(1),(2).
246. The idea appears to be not so recent as one might suppose. An early proposal for
a prepaid tuition plan appeared in 1977. See Bolch & Hinshaw, A Prepaid Tuition Plan for
Private Higher Education, 3 J. oF EDUC. FiN. 101 (1977).
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term of the contract, and Child is subject to income tax when Child receives
educational services under the contract.2 7 Potential imposition of gift tax
on contract purchasers is likely to have little practical impact because of
the $10,000 per donee annual gift tax exclusion and the unified gift tax
credit, which has the effect of excluding lifetime gifts up to a total of
$600,000. 2A' However, imposition of income tax liability on MET and Child
will have significant practical consequences.
With respect to Child, the tax impact is not catastrophic, but it can
produce some pain, especially to a cash-poor student. Assume that Parent
paid $6,000 for a four year MET contract, and in the year Child receives
educational services under the contract, the services are worth $5,000.
Assume also that Parent rightfully claims Child as a dependent on Parent's
income tax return, Child earns $2,500 at a summer job, and Child does
not itemize deductions.
Under these facts, Child would include $3,500 in gross income on
account of receiving the educational services ($5,000 value of services minus
$1,500, one-fourth of Child's substituted basis in the contract) plus the
$2,500 in wages. The standard deduction would completely offset the $2,500
in wage income. 29 However, Child's standard deduction would be limited
to $2,500, the amount of earned income, because he can be claimed as a
dependent by Parent. 210 Moreover, Child may not claim a personal exemp-
tion on Child's own return.? As a result, Child will pay tax on the entire
amount included in gross income on account of receiving the educational
services. At a fifteen percent tax rate, 2 2 the amount of tax would be $525.
Over a four year period, the income taxes paid by Child would total $2,100.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 50-73.
248. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (annual exclusion); § 2505 (unified credit).
249. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C),(5).
250. I.R.C. § 63(c)(5) provides in relevant part as follows:
In the case of an individual with respect to whom a deduction under section 151 is
allowable to another taxpayer ... the basic standard deduction ... shall not exceed
(A) $500, or
(B) such individual's earned income.
The value of the educational services presumably would not qualify as earned income for this
purpose, even though proposed regulations treat tax-includible scholarship amounts as earned
income for purposes of computing the standard deduction. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-
6(h), 53 Fed. Reg. 21694 (1988). I.R.C. § 63 does not currently contain a definition of earned
income. However, the related "kiddie tax" section defines earned income by reference to
I.R.C. § 911(d)(2) (foreign earned income exclusion), as did the 1954 Code predecessor of
I.R.C. §63. See I.R.C. §§ 1(i)(4), 911(d)(2); 1954 I.R.C. § 63(e)(2). The value of the educational
services would not be earned income under the I.R.C. § 911(d)(2) definition. For a discussion
of the income tax treatment of college students, see Philipps & Bullivant, The I1 Effects of
Mid-1980s Tax Policy On Higher Education, 6 AKRON TAx J. 45, 51-54, 65-68 (1989).
251. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(2), which provides in relevant part as follows:
In the case of an individual with respect to whom a deduction under this section is
allowable to another taxpayer ... , the exemption amount ... shall be zero.
252. I.R.C. § 1(c). Child would be taxed at his own rate, not Parent's rate, because Child
is over 14 years of age. See I.R.C. § (1)(i)(2).
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While this does not constitute an insurmountable barrier to Child's educa-
tional goals, it is certainly no encouragement.2 3
The effect of imposing tax on MET's investment income could be
drastic. Economists project the long-range college cost inflation rate to be
about two percentage points above the general inflation rate.254 Conse-
quently, if general inflation runs between five and six percent a year, a
prepaid tuition fund would need a net rate of return of at least eight percent
a year to keep pace with college inflation. The fund probably would aim
to achieve a higher rate of return than eight percent as an actuarial hedge
against unanticipated college cost inflation. Suppose the fund aims for a
ten percent rate of return. If the fund is taxed on its income at the thirty-
four percent corporate rate, it would have to achieve a before-tax rate of
return of over fifteen percent to achieve a ten percent after-tax return. 255
Manifestly, a fifteen percent sustained rate of return is difficult to achieve
for even the best investment managers.
The alternative to striving for a higher rate of return is to increase the
initial price charged for a prepaid tuition contract. For example, assume
the fund aims for an eight percent rate of return and projects that four
years' tuition eighteen years hence will be $25,000. If the fund pays no
income tax it needs to charge about $6,200 for a four year contract.
However, if the fund pays tax at the thirty-four percent corporate rate it
would have to charge $9,900 for the contract to achieve the same eight
percent rate of return after taxes. 2 6 The higher purchase price obviously
makes the contract less attractive. Furthermore, the higher price may pre-
clude entirely many lower-middle income purchasers from participating in
the plan. Such a result would be most unfortunate because middle income




The uncertainty of how existing law applies to prepaid tuition plans is,
in itself, a hindrance to their implementation. The only guidance from IRS
thus far has been in the form of two private letter rulings.28 These, of
course, have no binding precedential value, although they do offer an
253. In addition, Child presumably would pay FICA taxes on the $2,500 wage income.
At currently scheduled rates this would amount to $191.25 (7.65% times $2,500) payable by
Child and $191.25 payable by Child's employer.
254. See Anderson, Tax-Exempt College Savings Bonds: Problems and Solutions, in States
and the Bond Markets: Proceedings of a National Issues Seminar of the National Conference
of State Legislatures 102 (1988); College Savings and Prepayment Plans, supra note 30, at 9.
255. The 10%o after tax figure is computed as follows: 15% before-tax rate of return
minus 5.1%q tax (34% times 15%) equals 9.9% after-tax rate of return.
256. See Tax Implications, supra note 232, at 678.
257. See infra text accompanying notes 311-14.
258. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-01-027 (Jan. 6, 1989).
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indication of IRS thinking on the subject. 2 9 Prepaid tuition contracts are a
relatively new idea. They are plausibly analogous to a variety of situations.
260
Conceivably, any of these analogies might prevail ultimately.
However, potential plan sponsors need certainty, not abstract legal
speculation. Currently, it is not at all certain how plans set up differently
than MET might be taxed. For example, officials connected with the Florida
prepaid tuition plan disagree as to whether their investment fund will be
subject to a tax on its investment income.26' This has discouraged states
from going forward with prepaid tuition plans. Their only choices seem to
be to: 1) request a letter ruling, which is likely to be unfavorable in light
of the IRS ruling on the MET plan; (2) plunge ahead in the face of
uncertainty and be prepared to litigate; (3) wait for further developments;
or 4) abandon the idea of a prepaid tuition plan. Several states apparently
have opted for the third or fourth alternative. 262 Only Michigan, Wyoming,
and Florida actually have put prepaid tuition plans into operation.
263
The conclusion is that application of the current IRS position with
respect to taxation of prepaid tuition plans may not necessarily result in
their failure. However, the IRS position, along with the uncertainty of
existing law, assuredly makes successful implementation of such plans
considerably more difficult.
B. Desirability of Prepaid Tuition Plans
Prepaid tuition plans have distinct advantages over other means of
financing college education. Although existing plans also have disadvantages,
most notably that they tend to restrict college choice, these problems can
be overcome by changes in the structure of the plans. Moreover, even as
presently constituted, prepaid tuition plans are a step forward in college
financing alternatives.
1. Undersaving for College Costs
Families basically can pay for college costs out of three sources: savings,
current income, and loans. Many families are likely to use a combination
259. See I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3), which provides:
Unless the Secretary otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determination
may not be used or cited as precedent.
The term "written determination" includes letter rulings. See I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 74-246.
261. Florida's plan is established in such a way that some believe it has a stronger
argument for tax exemption as an integral part of the state. See TAX IMPLIcATIONs, supra note
232, at 678-79. But see supra note 194.
262. See 1989 SuRvEy, supra note 22, at § II; Tax Implications, supra note 232, at 678-
79; STATE SAVING AIN PREPADm TuTrON PLANs, supra note 8, at 17-30; Blumenstyk, Politically
and Financially, College Savings Plan Have Caught On, Chronicle of Higher Education, p.
A23, Oct. 4, 1989.
263. 1989 SuRvey, supra note 22, at § 11; Blumenstyk, supra note 262, at A23.
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of the three.264 However, families appear to be undersaving for college
costs. A widely quoted 1984 study found that only about half of the families
who plan to have a child attend college currently were saving anything for
that purpose. Moreover, the overall-median level of saving was only $517
(about $625 in current dollars) per year, and families tended to wait until
the child was within five or six years of college to begin saving.
265
There are several reasons why families undersave for college costs. First,
the available savings options for families may appear to be inadequate for
them in light of anticipated college costs. 266 For a small saver the common
alternatives for cash saving are savings accounts, series EE bonds, municipal
bonds, life insurance policies, common stocks, and annuities. Except for
common stocks, the rate of return on these investments historically has
been below the rate of college inflation.267 Interest income on Series EE
bonds purchased after December 31, 1989 will be excludible by taxpayers
below certain income levels to the extent proceeds of the bonds are used
for payment of college tuition and related fees. Therefore, the after-tax
return on these Series EE bonds will increase for eligible taxpayers. 26
Nevertheless, even with the benefit of tax exclusion, the return on Series
EE bonds (eighty-five percent of a three year moving average of five year
treasury bonds, with a six percent floor) is likely to be less than college
cost inflation. 269
More importantly, prevailing public policies, including tax policy, make
saving for college relatively unattractive. People save in order to meet
unanticipated emergencies, such as extraordinary medical expenses, and to
meet certain planned needs, such as retirement. 270 Government benefits, in
the form of Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and similar programs
provide for many of these needs. Furthermore, the tax system affords
substantial incentives for private sector employers to join in satisfying these
needs by providing employees with medical coverage, pension plans, and
other fringe benefits. Finally, the tax system includes strong incentives for
264. STATE SAVING AND PREPAID TuIToN PLANS, supra note 8, at 11.
265. Statement of John H. Finnerty in Tax Incentives for Education Hearing, supra note
4, at 194, 203 nn. 1-2, citing ROPER OsRANIzATION, A NATIONAL STUDY ON PARENTAL SAVINGS
FOR CHILDREN'S HIGHER EDUCATION EXPENSES 5 (National Institute of Independent Colleges
and Universities 1984). The study indicated that 70% of families with 1984 incomes in excess
of $30,000 saved for college. Their median savings level was $904 in 1984. Adjusted for
subsequent inflation, the current median yearly saving amount for these families would be
about $1,100. Id.
266. Most people, when asked, overestimate rather than underestimate the cost of attending
college. STATE SAVING AND PREPAID TUITION PLANS, supra note 8, at 11.
267. See Prepaying for Higher Education, supra note 29, at 4-7.
268. See I.R.C. § 135. The exclusion is phased out between modified adjusted gross
income levels of $60,000 and $90,000 for married couples filing joint returns (between $40,000
and 55,000 for single taxpayers and heads of household). Id. § 135(b)(2). Bond purchasers
who were under age 24 on the date of the bond's issuance and married taxpayers filing separate
returns are not eligible for the exclusion. Id. § 135(c)(l)(B),(d)(2).
269. Prepaying for Higher Education, supra note 29, at 17-18.
270. Id. at 3-4.
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individuals to funnel what savings they do undertake into the form of home
equity. Thus, the home mortgage interest deduction, 27' the tax-free rollover
of gain on sale of a principal residence, 272 the exclusion of gain on sale of
a principal residence by a person age fifty-five or older,273 the step-up in
basis of an asset at death, 274 and the exclusion from gross income of
unrealized asset appreciation 275 all afford powerful incentives for saving to
take the form of build-up in home equity.
In contrast, powerful governmental incentives to save for higher edu-
cation do not exist. The initiatives of states with baccalaureate bonds27 and
the federal government with tax exempt Series EE bonds thus far have been
fairly limited. Furthermore, the federal government actually has removed
several incentives for college saving that previously existed. 277 As a leading
commentator on financing college costs has said:
Higher education, particularly the independent sector, is conspic-
uously alone in creating a need for savings for which there is an
acknowledged public value yet no public inducements for private
capital accumulation.
278
The result has been that families generally depend too much on loans and
not enough on saving to finance college costs. 279
2. Advantages of Prepaid Tuition Plans
An ideal college saving plan would possess the following features: 1)
adequate return on investment to pay for college costs; 2) minimization of
college cost inflation risk; 3) adequate security for invested funds; 4) low
entry cost; and 5) flexibility of college choice.2 10 Prepayment plans do as
well or better than other college saving vehicles under the first four criteria.
Existing plans do not do as well under the last criterion-flexibility of
college choice. However, it is possible to refine the prepayment idea so that
plans can offer adequate flexibility in college choice.
Prepayment plans, such as MET, can offer a superior alternative to the
investments usually available to college savers, who normally must operate
in the retail investment market. Small investors normally operate under
substantial handicaps. First, they are unable to diversify their investments
271. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3),(4).
272. See I.R.C. § 1034.
273. See I.R.C. § 121.
274. See I.R.C. § 1014.
275. See B. BrrrKcR & L. LoKKEn, supra note 115, at 5-15 to 5-21.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 20-31.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
278. Prepaying for Higher Education, supra note 29, at 5.
279. See supra note 265; J. HANSEN, STuDENTr LoANs: ARE THEY OVRBRURDED nG A
GENERATION? 4-12 (1987) (published by College Entrance Examination Board, New York).
280. See Prepaying for Higher Education, supra note 29, at 12; statement of John D.
Finnerty in Tax Incentives for Education Hearing, supra note 4, at 190.
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sufficiently to protect against changing market conditions and risk. Even a
mutual fund does not solve the problem because the investor still must
choose a fund of which there will always be some winners and some
losers.2' Second, small investors usually have insufficient access to relevant
knowledge of the market and insufficient time and resources to obtain that
knowledge. 21
2
Finally, college savers will be hampered by a short time horizon for
their investment. The need for college funds arises within the time between
when the saver begins to save and when the children reach college age.
Therefore, college savers cannot depend on spanning cyclical markets. Their
investments do not span that long a time frame.u3 They need access to their
savings when their children are ready to matriculate. For safety, they need
to keep their savings in stable investments that tend to be low-yield. 214
Therefore, prepaid tuition plans promise to allow families to benefit from
more aggressive long-term investment strategies than they would otherwise
be able to do without taking on too much risk. Plan beneficiaries will
attend college over many years, not just the limited amount of time
appropriate for any one family. Plan managers can spread their investment
risks over time, paying less attention to investment volatility than individual
investors must do.25
Prepaid tuition plans also minimize college cost inflation risk for the
purchaser, because they basically shift that risk to the sponsor of the plan.
For example, if college costs go up faster than anticipated when Parent
purchases a MET contract, MET must adjust its price for future contract
purchasers to compensate for the unexpected costs. 6 This may be the single
most important advantage of prepayment plans, because other available
forms of saving do not shift the risk of college cost inflation. Thus, the
purchaser of a baccalaureate bond assumes the risk that college costs will
increase at a faster pace than the return on the bond. This is likewise true
of most other investment alternatives, such as Series EE bonds, savings
accounts, stocks, and mutual funds.3
A prepayment plan, such as MET's, also offers the college saver a high
degree of investment security, because its funds are pooled with other state
funds for investment purposes. Moreover, from a political standpoint, it is
281. See Prepaying for Higher Education, supra note 29, at 9-11.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Hansen, Pay Now. Go Later. College Prepayment and Tuition Plans, THE COLLEGE
BOAiD REv. pp. 8, 27 (No. 147 Spring 1988).
285. Id.
286. This is not an absolute guarantee, however, because the whole plan can simply
terminate if it becomes actuarially unsound. See MIcH LAWS § 390.1433(2). In this event, the
plan would distribute its assets prorata to holders of existing contracts. Id.
287. One financial institution, College Savings Bank of Princeton, N.J., does offer a
certificate of deposit indexed to the rate of college cost inflation, which it advertises as a
guarantee against college cost inflation risk. See RESEARCH DrvisION, COLLE SAy. BANc,
COLLEGESURE PLUS CD: HiGaR RaruR AND LOWER RISK (1988).
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unlikely that a state would allow its prepayment plan to default on obli-
gations.u 8 In a worst-case scenario in which the fund was terminated because
of actuarial unsoundness, the investors still would get their initial investment
back, plus in all likelihood at least some return on that investment.
Finally, prepayment plans can provide a low entry cost by authorizing
purchase of contracts on an installment basis. For example, MET has
arranged with financial institutions to make loans to MET contract pur-
chasers. The financial institution lends the purchaser the contract price,
which is paid over to a MET escrow account.8 9 The purchaser repays the
financial institution in installments. The unpaid balance on the loan is
secured by the funds transferred to MET, thereby affording the financial
institution a high degree of security for repayment of the loan. This permits
the financial institution to charge the purchaser a favorable interest rate. If
the purchaser defaults, MET pays off the loan, and credits any remaining
balance to the contract.
290
The installment plan aspect may be the most important impetus for
participation by lower and middle income families. It is quite difficult for
many people to save enough cash in a lump sum to make large purchases
or investments. For example, few persons save enough to purchase a new
automobile with cash, and almost no one purchases a personal residence
with cash. However, many people find it possible to "save" for purchase
of an automobile or home by paying for it in installments.
The outside discipline exercised by the payment book or mortgage
schedule provides sufficient motivation to pay the installments. When the
person has paid off the balance due, the person is likely to have substantial
equity remaining in the car or house and will have, in effect, "saved" that
equity. Paradoxically, the person has saved by borrowing. 291 The installment
plan has proven popular with MET contract purchasers, as a substantial
number of purchasers have chosen to pay in this manner. 292 Presumably,
this popularity comes from the convenience and discipline of the installment
arrangement, along with the favorable interest rates available by reason of
the fact that the loans are fully secured.
3. Disadvantages of Prepaid Tuition Plans
The most notable criticism of prepaid tuition plans is that they fail to
provide sufficient flexibility of college choice. 293 This is a valid criticism,
288. The possibility of such a state bail-out has been raised as an argument against states'
instituting prepaid tuition plans on the ground that it is improvident for a state to take on
the risk of a bail-out. See College Savings and Prepayment Plans, supra note 30, at 11.
289. See Michigan Education Trust Full Benefits Plan Contract § 5(a).
290. Id. § 5(b).
291. Installment payment for prepaid tuition plans could be made even more convenient
for purchasers by use of devices such as payroll deductions.
292. Owen Interview, supra note 211.
293. See, e.g., State Saving Incentive and Tuition Plans, supra note 8, at 50-53; College
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especially for plans sponsored by a single or small number of institutions.
The MET plan provides a tuition guarantee at every publicly supported
institution of higher education in the state. 294 Moreover, the plan contains
liberal refund provisions for beneficiaries who choose to attend independent
or out-of-state institutions, or who choose not to attend college at all. 295
Therefore, the MET plan, and others like it, do provide considerable
flexibility in college choice. Still, there is no denying that these plans afford
considerably less than absolute choice. They definitely tend to favor atten-
dance at state-supported institutions.
There are two answers to this criticism. The first is that something is
better than nothing. Prepaid plan beneficiaries may well find themselves
with a wider array of college choices than if the plan did not exist. Second,
there is nothing in the nature of prepaid plans that requires them to limit
college choice. It is possible to devise a plan that provides considerable
flexibility in college choice. To provide flexibility, more institutions must
participate in the plan. The National Association of Independent Colleges
and Universities has suggested the broad outlines of such a plan.296 Two
private companies, Hemar Corp. and College Prepayment Fund, Inc., also
are initiating plans that would provide a wide variety of college choice.
297
The problem lies not in the inherent nature of the idea, but rather in its
current implementation.
C. Legislative Proposals
The adverse impact of the IRS position enunciated in Letter Ruling 88-
25-027 on prepaid tuition plans, along with the uncertainty of how existing
law should apply to these plans, make clarifying legislation particularly
appropriate. The question of proper federal tax treatment for these plans
should be confronted directly, not approached by analogy to other situa-
tions.
Savings and Prepayment Plans, supra note 30, at 11; Statement of William J. Moore, President,
National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, in IN=vrATIONAL CONFERENCE,
supra note 3, at 16; Statement of John D. Finnerty, in Tax Incentives for Higher Education
Hearing, supra note 4, at 199.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
295. Id.
296. See National Ass'n of Ind. Colleges and Univ., Report of the NAICU Task Force
on Tuition Prepayment Plans (1987).
297. See Wilson, National Prepaid-Tuition Program is Started by Company Representing
14 Private Colleges, Chronicle of Higher Education, Oct. 25, 1981, p. A34; Putka, Group of
Colleges Endorses Tuition-Prepayment Plan, Wall St. J., July 18, 1989, p. Bi, col. 3. Under
such plans, a Parent would purchase a contract from a participating institution for a price set
by that institution. The educational benefits of the contract could be used at another partici-
pating institution at a value proportionate to the prices set by the respective institutions for
their contracts. Id. For example, assume the price of institution A's contract is $8,000 for one
year's tuition and the price for institution B is $10,000. Parent purchases a contract from
Institution A for $8,000. Child decides to attend institution B when the cost of one year's
tuition is $15,000. Child would be entitled to $12,000 ($8,000/$10,000 times $15,000) of
educational benefit under the contract.
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The question is should prepaid tuition plans be tax-favored. If so, what
form should tax-favored treatment take? A strong argument exists for some
form of treatment more favorable than the current IRS position. The current
IRS position, if sustained, would make the economic viability of prepaid
tuition plans quite doubtful.28 At the same time, there is a real need for
new ways for families to finance college education. Prepaid tuition plans
represent an innovative attempt to meet this need. This initiative should not
be abruptly forestalled by a shortsighted tax policy.
A few Congressmen have introduced proposed legislation according
favorable tax treatment to prepaid tuition plans. These bills generally would
exempt the prepayment fund, the purchaser, and the beneficiary of a
prepayment contract from income tax, but would not permit an income tax
deduction for the purchase price of a contract. 299 However, these proposals
have made no legislative progress to date.
1. Tax Neutrality
The treatment proposed by this legislation would afford tax neutrality
between the decision to save for college and the decision to consume,
whereas the current IRS treatment is biased against the decision to save and
in favor of the decision to consume.3°0 The IRS position is biased against
the saving decision, because the current income tax law in general is biased
against saving. This bias results from the fact that both saved income and
the investment return that saved income generates are taxed.3 °0
A simple example illustrates the idea. First assume that X earns $1,000
and there are no taxes. Assume also that X can earn a ten percent return
on saved income. X has the choice of spending the $1,000 on consumption
or saving it and earning an additional $100 income. The price of each dollar
of additional income is $10 in foregone consumption.
0 2
Next, assume that there is a twenty-five percent income tax similar in
structure to the current income tax. After tax there would be $750 left of
the original $1,000 earned. If X invests this $750 at 10 percent X will receive
$75 additional income. This $75 income will in turn be subject to the twenty-
five percent tax, leaving an after-tax return of $56.25. The twenty-five
percent tax raises the cost in foregone consumption of each additional dollar
298. See supra text accompanying notes 247-63.
299. See S. 7751, The Family College Savings Act of 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (June
22, 1989) (introduced by Sen. Boren); H.R. 1908, Higher Education Prepayment Tax Act of
1989, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (April 13, 1989) (introduced by Rep. Flippo); H.R. 147, Family
Equity Act of 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 3, 1989) (introduced by Rep. Craig); H.R.
3709, Deduction for Education Savings Act, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 17, 1989) (introduced
by Rep. McEwen).
300. See N. TuaR & S. ENTIN, SAvE, AMERICA 15-18 (1988).
301. Id. at 15.
302. Id. This discussion assumes that investment is a substitute good for current con-
sumption, because investment is equivalent to deferred consumption. See J. DODGE, THE LoOMc
OF TAx 326 (1989).
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of income from $10 to $13.33 ($750 foregone consumption returns $56.25
additional income). Hence, the twenty-five percent tax raises the foregone
income cost of saving by thirty-three percent. 0 3
Exempting the investment income from income tax accomplishes tax
neutrality between the consumption and saving decisions. Assume the same
facts and twenty-five percent tax rate as above, except that the additional
income is exempted from tax. The $750 after-tax income when saved
produces $75 additional income on which no tax is paid. Consequently, the
cost of one dollar additional income is $10, the same as in the no-tax
situation, and tax neutrality exists between the consumption and saving
decisions. 304
2. Tax Expenditure
Aside from tax-neutrality, there is a question concerning the fiscal
soundness of exempting the income generated by a prepayment plan from
tax. Some may argue that such an exemption would be an unwise "tax
expenditure." There are two responses to this argument.
First, the tax expenditure concept, itself, is not without flaws. The idea
is based on the notion that in an ideal income tax all economic income-
defined as personal consumption plus wealth accumulation-should be
taxed.305 The next step is to assert that deviations from this ideal income
tax base represent indirect subsidies or tax expenditures for those who pay
less tax because of the deviation.Ic 6
The tax expenditure is measured by the revenue foregone by the gov-
ernment on account of deviation from the ideal. However, as presently
formulated, the measurement of foregone revenue is inaccurate because it
fails to take into account changes in taxpayer behavior that will occur if a
303. J. DODGE, supra note 302, at 16.
304. Id. at 17.
305. This is the well-known Haig-Simons definition of income. See R.M. HMAG, THE
FEDERAL INcoME TAX 7 (1921), reprinted in READINGS IN THE EcoNOMIcs OF TAxATION 54 (R.
Musgrave & C. Shoup eds. 1959); H. SIoMNs, PERSONAL INCOME TA XATON 50-55 (1938). In
Simon's formal presentation of the income concept, personal income is defined as:
[T]he algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and
(2) the change in value of the store of property rights between the beginning and
end of the period in question.
SIMONs, supra, at 50. A frequently used short formulation is "income equals personal
consumption and accumulation." See Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies
for Personal Expenditures, 16 J. L. & ECON. 193, 195-206 (1973) (brief history and explanation
of Haig-Simons definition). For an extensive discussion of the merits of using the Haig-Simons
definition as a guide for tax policy, see B. BrrncKER, C. GALvn, R. MusoRAvE, & J. PEcmAN,
A COMPREHENSIw INcoME TAx BASE? A DEBATE (1968).
306. A classic exposition of the tax expenditure concept is Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expen-
ditures, 83 HAgv. L. REV. 705 (1970). This article was amplified in Surrey & McDaniel, The
Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REv. 225 (1979).
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deviation from the ideal income tax base is eliminated. For example, it is
incorrect to assert that exempting income of prepaid tuition plans will
decrease government revenue by an amount equivalent to the product of
the exempted income times the applicable tax rate.3 7 The existence of the
exemption will affect the amount of foregone revenue.
The tax expenditure concept also fails to take a long view. Granting
tax exemption to prepaid tuition plans may result in short-term revenue
loss, but long-term revenue will increase if the tax exemption fosters a better
educated and, hence, higher earning work-force.38 Furthermore, the tax
expenditure concept assumes that income, broadly defined, is the proper
tax base. But this assumption begs the question. Viewed from the perspective
of saving/consumption neutrality, a tax that exempts the income derived
from saving may be more appropriate. 309 Finally, in a common sense 10 vein,
the proponents of the concept seem to have an underlying premise that the
government has a preeminent right to a taxpayer's income, so that whatever
the government does not take from a taxpayer in the form of taxes becomes,
mirabile dictu, a "tax expenditure."
A second response to the tax expenditure objection is that even if
everything that proponents of the tax expenditure concept claim for it is
true, the societal gains to be derived from prepaid tuition plans are worth
the cost. Opponents of tax exemption for prepaid tuition plans are likely
to argue that these plans will benefit mainly the well-off; that "tax expen-
ditures" and direct government aid are better directed to lower income
groups. The answer to this is that direct government aid in the form of
307. See Stiglitz & Boskin, Impact of Recent Developments in Public Finance Theory on
Policy Decisions, 67 AM. EcoN. REv. 295 (1977).
308. A recently published book aptly expresses the long range need for a highly educated
work-force as follows:
As the economies of developed nations move further into the post-industrial era,
human capital plays an ever more important role in their progress. As the society
becomes more complex, the amount of education and knowledge needed to make a
productive contribution to the economy becomes greater. A century ago, a high
school education was thought to be superfluous for factory workers and a college
degree was the mark of an academic or lawyer. Between now and the year 2000,
for the first time in history, a majority of all new jobs will require post-secondary
education. Many professions will require nearly a decade of study following high
school, and even the least skilled jobs will require a command of reading and
thinking that was once necessary only for the professions.
Education and training are the primary systems by which the human capital of a
nation is preserved and increased. The speed and efficiency with which these education
systems transmit knowledge govern the rate at which human capital can be developed.
Even more than such closely-watched indicators as the rate of investment in plant
and equipment, human capital formation plays a direct role in how fast the economy
can grow.
W. JOHNSTON, WORKFORCE 2000; WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, quoted in
statement of American Society of Chemical Engineers in Tax Incentives for Education Hearing,
supra note 4, at 234-35.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 300-04.
310. The author realizes this is anathema in an academic article.
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guaranteed loans and Pell grants currently is directed at lower income
students. The middle income group, by contrast, has come up short on
government aid over the past decade. This was forcefully expressed by a
participant at a recent conference on prepayment plans, who said:
Middle-income squeeze-this is what it's called, I guess-is a fact
across the nation. Families that don't qualify for financial aid, yet
don't have the big bucks to afford the big institutions, are the ones
that are basically being squeezed out of higher education. So a
prepayment plan may really attract them."'
Thus far, MET's experience bears this out. An analysis of MET contract
purchasers in MET's initial year found that more than half of contract
purchasers had family income of less than $50,000.312 The average income
of a working family of four in Michigan is about $46,000.313 Average
working families are precisely the group prepaid tuition plans aim to help.
Whatever "tax expenditures" may be involved in granting favorable treat-
ment to these plans will be money well "spent" in the long run.
31 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Prepaid tuition plans offer middle income taxpayers a sound opportunity
for self-help in financing their children's education. Their development
ought not to be frustrated by the short-sighted tax policy enunciated in
Letter Ruling 88-25-027. Legislation granting prepaid tuition plans favorable
tax status should be enacted. Such legislation will pay dividends far into
the future.
311. Statement of Shari Caprara, Legislative Director, Florida Student Association, in
INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 14.
312. Jones, Study of Prepaid Tuition Plan Finds Mid-Income Acceptance, Detroit Free




Under $20,000 17% 17%
$20,000 to $39,999 18% 35%
$40,000 to $59,999 26% 61%
$60,000 to $79,999 20% 81%
Over $80,000 19% 100%
Id.
313. Id.
314. The pressure for more government aid in financing college education may increase
in the next five to ten years as the children of the baby boom generation come of college age.
Currently, child-care for these children is a pressing issue. When the baby-boomers' children
are ready for college it will not be surprising to see college financing come to the forefront
as a political issue.
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